<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?> version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<!DOCTYPE rfc [
  <!ENTITY nbsp    "&#160;">
  <!ENTITY zwsp   "&#8203;">
  <!ENTITY nbhy   "&#8209;">
  <!ENTITY wj     "&#8288;">
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="rfc2629.xslt" ?>

<!-- generated by https://github.com/cabo/kramdown-rfc version 1.6.11 (Ruby 3.1.2) -->

<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-15" number="9577" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" updates="" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" version="3">

  <!-- xml2rfc v2v3 conversion 3.12.10 -->
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Privacy Pass Authentication">The Privacy Pass HTTP Authentication Scheme</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-auth-scheme-15"/> name="RFC" value="9577"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Pauly" fullname="Tommy Pauly">
      <organization>Apple Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>One Apple Park Way</street>
          <city>Cupertino, California 95014</city>
          <city>Cupertino</city>
	  <region>California</region>
	  <code>95014</code>
	  <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>tpauly@apple.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Valdez" fullname="Steven Valdez">
      <organization>Google LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <email>svaldez@chromium.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="C. A." surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
      <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      <address>
        <email>caw@heapingbits.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2023" month="October" day="23"/> year="2024" month="May"/>
    <area>sec</area>
    <workgroup>privacypass</workgroup>
    <keyword>anonymous</keyword>
    <keyword>authorization</keyword>
    <keyword>crypto</keyword>
    <abstract>
      <t>This document defines an HTTP authentication scheme for Privacy Pass,
a privacy-preserving authentication mechanism used for authorization.
The authentication scheme specified in this document can be used by clients Clients
to redeem Privacy Pass tokens with an origin. Origin. It can also be used by
origins
Origins to challenge clients Clients to present Privacy Pass tokens.</t>
    </abstract>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>
      <t>Privacy Pass tokens are unlinkable authenticators that can be used to
anonymously authorize a client Client (see
<xref target="ARCHITECTURE"/>). target="RFC9576"/>).
Tokens are generated by token issuers, Issuers, on the basis of authentication,
attestation, or some previous action such as solving a CAPTCHA. A client Client
possessing such a token is able to prove that it was able to get a token
issued, without allowing the relying party redeeming the client's Client's token
(the origin) Origin) to link it with the issuance flow.</t>
      <t>Different types of authenticators, using different token issuance protocols,
can be used as Privacy Pass tokens.</t>
      <t>This document defines a common HTTP authentication scheme
(<xref section="11" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>), PrivateToken, "PrivateToken", that allows clients Clients to redeem various
kinds of Privacy Pass tokens.</t>
      <t>Clients and relying parties (origins) (Origins) interact using this scheme to perform the
token challenge and token redemption flow. In particular, origins Origins challenge
clients
Clients for a token with an HTTP Authentication authentication challenge (using the
WWW-Authenticate response header field). Clients can then react to that
challenge by issuing a new request with a corresponding token (using the Authorization
request header field). Clients generate tokens that match the origin's Origin's token
challenge by running one of the token issuance protocol protocols defined in
<xref target="ISSUANCE"/>. target="RFC9578"/>. The act of presenting a token in an
Authorization request header field is referred to as token redemption. "token redemption". This
interaction between client the Client and origin Origin is shown below.</t>

<!-- Removed height="192" width="456" to see if the SVG will display
   correctly in the HTML and PDF outputs. -->

      <figure anchor="fig-overview">
        <name>Challenge and redemption protocol flow</name> Redemption Protocol Flow</name>
        <artset>
          <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="192" width="456" viewBox="0 0 456 192" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
              <path d="M 8,32 L 8,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 40,64 L 40,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 80,32 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 328,32 L 328,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 360,64 L 360,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 360,144 L 360,176" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 400,32 L 400,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 8,32 L 80,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 328,32 L 400,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 8,64 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 328,64 L 400,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 40,96 L 56,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 336,96 L 352,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 48,160 L 96,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <path d="M 280,160 L 360,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="360,96 348,90.4 348,101.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,352,96)"/>
              <polygon class="arrowhead" points="56,160 44,154.4 44,165.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,48,160)"/>
              <g class="text">
                <text x="44" y="52">Origin</text>
                <text x="364" y="52">Client</text>
                <text x="136" y="100">WWW-Authenticate:</text>
                <text x="268" y="100">TokenChallenge</text>
                <text x="284" y="132">(Run</text>
                <text x="340" y="132">issuance</text>
                <text x="416" y="132">protocol)</text>
                <text x="164" y="164">Authorization:</text>
                <text x="248" y="164">Token</text> y="164">token</text>
              </g>
            </svg>
          </artwork>
          <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
+--------+                              +--------+
| Origin |                              | Client |
+---+----+                              +---+----+
    |                                       |
    +-- WWW-Authenticate: TokenChallenge -->|
    |                                       |
    |                            (Run issuance protocol)
    |                                       |
    |<------ Authorization: Token token ----------+
    |                                       |
]]></artwork>
        </artset>
      </figure>
      <t>In addition to working with different token issuance protocols, this scheme
optionally supports the use of tokens that are associated with origin-chosen Origin-chosen
contexts and specific origin Origin names. Relying parties that request and redeem
tokens can choose a specific kind of token, as appropriate for its use case.
These options (1) allow for different deployment models to prevent double-spending, double-spending and (2) allow for both interactive (online challenges) and non-interactive (pre-fetched) tokens.</t>
      <section anchor="terminology">
        <name>Terminology</name>
         <t>The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
         "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>",
         "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>",
         "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
         "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
         "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "OPTIONAL" "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document
         are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 BCP&nbsp;14
         <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/> when, and only
         when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t>
        <t>Unless otherwise specified, this document encodes protocol messages in TLS
notation from
<xref target="TLS13"/>, Section 3.</t> target="RFC8446" sectionFormat="comma" section="3"/>.</t>
        <t>This document uses the terms "Client", "Origin", "Issuer", "Issuance Protocol", "issuance protocol",
and "Token" as defined in <xref target="ARCHITECTURE"/>. target="RFC9576"/>. It additionally
uses the following terms in more specific ways:</t>
        <ul
        <dl spacing="normal">
          <li>Issuer key: Keying
          <dt>Issuer key:</dt><dd>Keying material that can be used with an issuance protocol
to create a signed token.</li>
          <li>Token challenge: A token.</dd>
          <dt>Token challenge:</dt><dd>A request for tokens sent from an origin Origin to a client, Client, using
the "WWW-Authenticate" HTTP header field. This challenge identifies a specific
token issuer Issuer and issuance protocol. Token challenges optionally include
one or both of: of the following: a redemption context (see <xref target="context-construction"/>), target="context-construction"/>) and
a list of associated origins. Origins. These optional values are can then
be bound to the token that is issued.</li>
          <li>Token redemption: An issued.</dd>
          <dt>Token redemption:</dt><dd>An action by which a client Client presents a token to an origin Origin
in an HTTP request, using the "Authorization" HTTP header field.</li>
        </ul> field.</dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="challenge-redemption">
      <name>HTTP Authentication Scheme</name>
      <t>Token redemption is performed using HTTP Authentication authentication
(<xref section="11" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>), with the scheme "PrivateToken". Origins challenge
clients
Clients to present a token from a specific issuer Issuer (<xref target="challenge"/>). Once a
client
Client has received a token from that issuer, Issuer or already has a valid token
available, it presents the token to the origin Origin (<xref target="redemption"/>). The process of
presenting a token as authentication to an origin Origin is also referred to
as "spending" a token.</t>
      <t>In order to prevent linkability across different transactions, clients Clients
will often present a particular "PrivateToken" only once. Origins can link multiple
transactions to the same client Client if that client Client spends the same token value more
than once. As such, origins Origins ought to expect at most one unique token
value, carried in one request, for each challenge.</t>
      <t>The rest of this section describes the token challenge and redemption interactions
in more detail.</t>
      <section anchor="challenge">
        <name>Token Challenge</name>
        <t>Origins send a token challenge to clients Clients in an a "WWW-Authenticate" header field
with the "PrivateToken" scheme. This authentication scheme has two mandatory parameters:
one containing a token challenge and another containing the token-key used for
producing (and verifying) a corresponding token.</t>
        <t>Origins that support the "PrivateToken" authentication scheme need to handle
the following tasks in constructing the WWW-Authenticate header field:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Select which issuer Issuer to use, and configure the issuer Issuer name and token-key to
include in WWW-Authenticate token challenges. The issuer Issuer name is included in
the token challenge, and the issuer Issuer token-key is used to populate the
WWW-Authenticate header parameter.</li>
          <li>Determine a redemption context construction to include in the
token challenge, as discussed in <xref target="context-construction"/>.</li>
          <li>Select the origin Origin information to include in the token challenge. This can
be empty to allow fully cross-origin cross-Origin tokens, a single origin Origin name that
matches the origin Origin itself for per-origin per-Origin tokens, or a list of origin Origin names
containing the origin Origin itself. See <xref section="3.4" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/> for more
information about the difference between cross-origin cross-Origin and per-origin per-Origin tokens.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>Once these decisions are made, origins Origins construct the WWW-Authenticate header
by first constructing the token challenge as described in <xref target="challenge-structure"/>.
Origins send challenges as described in <xref target="send-challenge"/>, and clients Clients process
them as described in <xref target="process-challenge"/> Sections&nbsp;<xref target="process-challenge" format="counter"/> and <xref target="caching"/>.</t> target="caching" format="counter"/>.</t>
        <section anchor="challenge-structure">
          <name>Token Challenge Structure</name>

          <t>This document defines the default challenge structure that can be used across
token types, although future token types MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> extend or modify the structure
of the challenge; see <xref target="token-types"/> for the registry information
which
that establishes and defines the relationship between "token_type" and the
contents of the TokenChallenge message.</t>
          <t>All token challenges MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> begin with a 2-octet integer that defines the
token type, in network byte order. This type indicates the issuance protocol
used to generate the token and determines the structure and semantics of the rest of
the structure. Values are registered in an IANA registry, registry; see <xref target="token-types"/>. Client MUST Clients <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
ignore challenges with token types they do not support.</t>
          <t>Even when a given token type uses the default challenge structure,
the requirements on the presence or interpretation of the fields can differ
across token types. For example, some token types might require that "origin_info"
is non-empty, while others allow it to be empty.</t>
          <t>The default TokenChallenge message has the following structure:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
struct {
    uint16_t token_type;
    opaque issuer_name<1..2^16-1>;
    opaque redemption_context<0..32>;
    opaque origin_info<0..2^16-1>;
} TokenChallenge;
]]></artwork>
          <t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, in network byte order, as described
above.</li>
            <li>"issuer_name" is an ASCII string that identifies the issuer Issuer, using the format of a
server name as defined in <xref target="server-name"/>. This name identifies the issuer Issuer that is allowed to
issue tokens that can be redeemed by this origin. Origin. The field that stores this string in the challenge
is prefixed with a 2-octet integer indicating the length, in network byte order.</li>
            <li>"redemption_context" is a field that is either 0 or 32 bytes, prefixed with a single
octet indicating the length (either 0 or 32). If the value is non-empty, it is a 32-byte value
generated by the origin Origin that allows the origin Origin to require that clients Clients fetch tokens
bound to a specific context, as opposed to reusing tokens that were fetched for other
contexts. See <xref target="context-construction"/> for example contexts that might be useful in
practice. Challenges with redemption_context values of invalid lengths MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</li>
            <li>"origin_info" is an ASCII string that is either empty, is empty or contains one or more
origin
Origin names that allow a token to be scoped to a specific set of origins. Origins. Each
origin
Origin name uses the format of a server name as defined in <xref target="server-name"/>. The string
is prefixed with a 2-octet integer indicating the length, in network byte order.
If empty, any non-origin-specific non-Origin-specific token can be redeemed. If the string contains
multiple origin Origin names, they are delimited with commas "," (",") without any whitespace.
If this field is not empty, the Origin MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include its own name as one of the
names in the list.</li>
          </ul>
          <t>If "origin_info" contains multiple origin Origin names, this means the challenge is valid
for any of the origins Origins in the list, including the origin which Origin that issued the challenge
(which must always be present in the list if it is non-empty; see <xref target="process-challenge"/>).
This can be useful in settings where clients Clients pre-fetch and cache tokens for a particular
challenge -- including the "origin_info" field -- and then later redeem these tokens
with one of the origins Origins in the list. See <xref target="caching"/> for more discussion about
token caching.</t>
          <section anchor="server-name">
            <name>Server Name Encoding</name>
            <t>Server names contained in a token challenge are ASCII strings that contain a hostname
and optional port, where the port is implied to be "443" if missing. The names use the
format of the authority portion of a URI as defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="URI"/>. target="RFC3986"/>.
The names MUST NOT <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include a "userinfo" portion of an authority. For example, a valid
server name might be "issuer.example.com" or "issuer.example.com:8443",
but not "issuer@example.com".</t>
          </section>
          <section anchor="context-construction">
            <name>Redemption Context Construction</name>
            <t>The TokenChallenge redemption context allows the origin Origin to determine the
context in which a given token can be redeemed. This value can be a unique
per-request nonce, constructed from 32 freshly generated random bytes. It
can also represent state or properties of the client Client session. Some example
properties and methods for constructing the corresponding context are below.
This list is not exhaustive.</t>
            <ul
            <dl spacing="normal">
              <li>Context
              <dt>Context bound to a given time window: Construct window:</dt><dd>Construct the redemption context as
F(current time window), where F is a pseudorandom function.</li>
              <li>Context function.</dd>
              <dt>Context bound to a client network: Construct Client network based on Autonomous System Number (ASN):</dt><dd>Construct the redemption context as
F(client
F(Client ASN), where F is a pseudorandom function.</li>
              <li>Context function.</dd>
              <dt>Context bound to a given time window and client network: Construct Client network:</dt><dd>Construct the redemption
context as F(current time window, client Client ASN), where F is a pseudorandom function.</li>
            </ul> function.</dd>
            </dl>
            <t>Preventing double spending double-spending on tokens requires the origin Origin to keep state
associated with the redemption context. An empty redemption context is not
bound to any property of the client Client request, so state to prevent double spending double-spending
needs to be stored and shared across all origin Origin servers that can accept tokens until
token-key expiration or rotation. For a non-empty redemption context, the
double spend
double-spend state only needs to be stored across the set of origin Origin servers that will
accept tokens with that redemption context.</t>
            <t>Origins that share redemption contexts, i.e., by using the same redemption
context, choosing the same issuer, Issuer, and providing the same origin_info field in
the TokenChallenge, must necessarily share state required to enforce double
spend
double-spend prevention. Origins should consider the operational complexity of this
shared state before choosing to share redemption contexts. Failure to
successfully synchronize this state and use it for double spend double-spend prevention can
allow Clients to redeem tokens to one Origin that were issued after an
interaction with another Origin that shares the context.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="send-challenge">
          <name>Sending Token Challenges</name>
          <t>When used in an authentication challenge, the "PrivateToken" scheme uses the
following parameters:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>"challenge", which contains a base64url-encoded <xref target="RFC4648"/> base64url TokenChallenge
value. value, encoded per <xref target="RFC4648"/>. This document follows the default padding behavior described in
<xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="RFC4648"/>, so the base64url value MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include padding.
As an Authentication Parameter authentication parameter (<tt>auth-param</tt> from <xref section="11.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>),
the value can be either a token or a quoted-string, quoted-string and might be required to
be a quoted-string if the base64url string includes "=" characters. This
parameter is required for all challenges.</li>
            <li>"token-key", which contains a base64url encoding of the public key for
use with the issuance protocol indicated by the challenge. See <xref target="ISSUANCE"/> target="RFC9578"/>
for more information about how this public key is used by the issuance protocols
described in that specification. The encoding of
the public key is determined by the token type; see <xref target="token-types"/>.
As with "challenge", the base64url value MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include padding. As an
Authentication Parameter
authentication parameter (<tt>auth-param</tt> from <xref section="11.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>), the
value can be either a token or a quoted-string, quoted-string and might be required to be a
quoted-string if the base64url string includes "=" characters. This parameter
MAY
<bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be omitted in deployments where clients Clients are able to retrieve the issuer Issuer key
using an out-of-band mechanism.</li>
            <li>"max-age", which is an optional parameter that consists of the number of seconds for
which the challenge will be accepted by the origin.</li> Origin.</li>
          </ul>
          <t>The header field MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> also include the standard "realm" parameter, if desired.
Issuance protocols MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> define other parameters, some of which might be required.
Clients MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore parameters in challenges that are not defined for the issuance
protocol corresponding to the token type in the challenge.</t>
          <t>As an example, the WWW-Authenticate header field could look like this:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
WWW-Authenticate:
  PrivateToken challenge="abc...", token-key="123..."
]]></artwork>
          <section anchor="sending-multiple-token-challenges">
            <name>Sending Multiple Token Challenges</name>
            <t>It is possible for the WWW-Authenticate header field to include multiple
challenges (<xref section="11.6.1" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>). This allows the origin Origin to indicate
support for different token types, issuers, types or different Issuers, or to include multiple redemption
contexts. For example, the WWW-Authenticate header field could look like this:</t>
            <artwork><![CDATA[
WWW-Authenticate:
  PrivateToken challenge="abc...", token-key="123...",
  PrivateToken challenge="def...", token-key="234..."
]]></artwork>
            <t>Origins should only include challenges for different types of issuance
protocols with functionally equivalent properties. For instance, both issuance
protocols in <xref target="ISSUANCE"/> target="RFC9578"/> have the same functional properties, albeit with
different mechanisms for verifying the resulting tokens during redemption.
Since clients Clients are free to choose which challenge they want to consume when
presented with options, mixing multiple challenges with different functional
properties for one use case is nonsensical. If the origin Origin has a preference
for one challenge over another (for example, if one uses a token type
that is faster to verify), it can sort it to be first in the list
of challenges as a hint to the client.</t> Client.</t>
          </section>
        </section>
        <section anchor="process-challenge">
          <name>Processing Token Challenges</name>
          <t>Upon receipt of a challenge, a client Client validates the TokenChallenge structure
before taking any action, such as fetching a new token or redeeming a token
in a new request. Validation requirements are as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>The token_type is recognized and supported by the client;</li> Client;</li>
            <li>The TokenChallenge structure is well-formed; and</li>
            <li>If the origin_info field is non-empty, the name of the origin Origin that issued the
authentication challenge is included in the list of origin Origin names. Comparison
of the origin Origin name that issued the authentication challenge against elements
in the origin_info list is done via case-insensitive equality checks.</li>
          </ul>
          <t>If validation fails, the client MUST NOT Client <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> fetch or redeem a token based on the
challenge. Clients MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> have further restrictions and requirements around
validating when a challenge is considered acceptable or valid. For example,
clients
Clients can choose to ignore challenges that list origin Origin names for which the
current connection is not authoritative (according to the TLS certificate).</t>
          <t>Caching and pre-fetching of tokens is are discussed in <xref target="caching"/>.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="caching">
          <name>Token Caching</name>
          <t>Clients can generate multiple tokens from a single TokenChallenge, TokenChallenge and cache
them for future use. This improves privacy by separating the time of token
issuance from the time of token redemption, and also allows clients Clients to avoid
any
the overhead of receiving new tokens via the issuance protocol.</t>
          <t>Cached tokens can only be redeemed when they match all of the fields in the
TokenChallenge: token_type, issuer_name, redemption_context, and origin_info.
Clients ought to store cached tokens based on all of these fields, to
avoid trying to redeem a token that does not match. Note that each token
has a unique client Client nonce, which is sent in token redemption (<xref target="redemption"/>).</t>
          <t>If a client Client fetches a batch of multiple tokens for future use that are bound
to a specific redemption context (the redemption_context in the TokenChallenge
was not empty), clients SHOULD Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> discard these tokens upon flushing state such as
HTTP cookies <xref target="COOKIES"/>, target="I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis"/>, or if there is a network
change and the client Client does not have any origin-specific Origin-specific state like HTTP cookies.
Using these tokens in a context that otherwise would not be linkable to the
original context could allow the origin Origin to recognize a client.</t> Client.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
      <section anchor="redemption">
        <name>Token Redemption</name>
        <t>The output of the issuance protocol is a token that corresponds to the origin's Origin's
challenge (see <xref target="challenge"/>).</t>
        <section anchor="token-structure">
          <name>Token Structure</name>
          <t>A token is a structure that begins with a two-octet 2-octet field that indicates a token
type, which MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match the token_type in the TokenChallenge structure. This value
determines the structure and semantics of the rest of the token structure.</t>
          <t>This document defines the default token structure that can be used across
token types, although future token types MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> extend or modify the structure
of the token; see <xref target="token-types"/> for the registry information which that
establishes and defines the relationship between "token_type" and the contents
of the Token token structure.</t>
          <t>The default Token token message has the following structure:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
struct {
    uint16_t token_type;
    uint8_t nonce[32];
    uint8_t challenge_digest[32];
    uint8_t token_key_id[Nid];
    uint8_t authenticator[Nk];
} Token;
]]></artwork>
          <t>The structure fields are defined as follows:</t>
          <ul spacing="normal">
            <li>"token_type" is a 2-octet integer, in network byte order, as described
above.</li>
            <li>"nonce" is a 32-octet value containing a client-generated Client-generated random nonce.</li>
            <li>"challenge_digest" is a 32-octet value containing the hash of the
original TokenChallenge, SHA-256(TokenChallenge), where SHA-256 is as defined
in <xref target="SHS"/>. Changing the hash function to something
other than SHA-256 would require defining a new token type and token structure
(since the contents of challenge_digest would be computed differently),
which can be done in a future specification.</li>
            <li>"token_key_id" is a Nid-octet identifier for the token authentication
key. The value of this field is defined by the token_type and corresponding
issuance protocol.</li>
            <li>"authenticator" is a Nk-octet authenticator that is cryptographically bound
to the preceding fields in the token; see <xref target="verification"/> for more information
about how this field is used in verifying a token. The token_type and corresponding
issuance protocol determine the value of the authenticator field and how it is computed.
The value of constant Nk depends on token_type, as defined in <xref target="token-types"/>.</li>
          </ul>
          <t>The authenticator value in the Token token structure is computed over the token_type,
nonce, challenge_digest, and token_key_id fields. A token is considered a valid
if token verification using succeeds; see <xref target="verification"/> for details about
verifying the token and its authenticator value.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="sending-tokens">
          <name>Sending Tokens</name>
          <t>When used for client Client authorization, the "PrivateToken" authentication
scheme defines one parameter, "token", which contains the base64url-encoded
Token struct.
token structure. As with the challenge parameters (<xref target="challenge"/>), the base64url
value MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> include padding. As an Authentication Parameter authentication parameter (<tt>auth-param</tt> from
<xref section="11.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>), the value can be either a token or a
quoted-string,
quoted-string and might be required to be a quoted-string if the base64url
string includes "=" characters. All unknown or unsupported parameters to
"PrivateToken" authentication credentials MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.</t>
          <t>Clients present this Token token structure to origins Origins in a new HTTP request using
the Authorization header field as follows:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
Authorization: PrivateToken token="abc..."
]]></artwork>
          <t>For context-bound tokens, origins Origins store or reconstruct the contexts of previous
TokenChallenge structures in order to validate the token. A TokenChallenge can
be bound to a specific TLS session with a client, Client, but origins Origins can also accept
tokens for valid challenges in new sessions. Origins SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> implement some form
of double-spend prevention that prevents a token with the same nonce from being
redeemed twice. Double-spend prevention ensures that clients Clients cannot replay tokens
for previous challenges. See <xref target="replay-attacks"/> for more information about replay
attacks. For context-bound tokens, this double-spend prevention can require no state
or minimal state, since the context can be used to verify token uniqueness.</t>
        </section>
        <section anchor="verification">
          <name>Token Verification</name>
          <t>A token consists of some input cryptographically bound to an authenticator
value, such as a digital signature. Verifying a token consists of checking that
the authenticator value is correct.</t>
          <t>The authenticator value is as computed when running and finalizing the issuance
protocol corresponding to the token type with the following value values as the input:</t>
          <artwork><![CDATA[
struct {
    uint16_t token_type;
    uint8_t nonce[32];
    uint8_t challenge_digest[32];
    uint8_t token_key_id[Nid];
} AuthenticatorInput;
]]></artwork>
          <t>The value values of these fields are as described in <xref target="redemption"/>. target="token-structure"/>. The cryptographic
verification check depends on the token type; see <xref
Sections&nbsp;<xref target="RFC9578" section="5.4" sectionFormat="of" target="ISSUANCE"/> sectionFormat="bare"/> and <xref target="RFC9578" section="6.4" sectionFormat="of" target="ISSUANCE"/> sectionFormat="bare"/> of <xref target="RFC9578"/> for verification instructions for the issuance
protocols described in <xref target="ISSUANCE"/>. that specification. As such, the security properties of the
token, e.g., the probability that one can forge an authenticator value without
invoking the issuance protocol, depend on the cryptographic algorithm used by
the issuance protocol as determined by the token type.</t>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="client-behavior">
      <name>Client Behavior</name>
      <t>When a client Client receives one or more token challenges in response to a request,
the client Client has a set of choices to make:</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>Whether or not to redeem a token via a new request to the origin.</li> Origin.</li>
        <li>Whether to redeem a previously issued and cached token, token or redeem a token freshly issued from the issuance protocol.</li>
        <li>If multiple challenges were sent, which challenge to use for redeeming a
token on a subsequent request.</li>
      </ul>
      <t>The approach to these choices depends on the use case of the application, as
well as the deployment model (see <xref section="4" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/> for discussion
of the different deployment models).</t>
      <section anchor="choosing-to-redeem-tokens">
        <name>Choosing to Redeem Tokens</name>
        <t>Some applications of tokens might require clients Clients to always present a token
as authentication in order to successfully make requests. For example, a restricted
service that wants to only allow access to valid users, users but wants to do so without learning
specific user credential information, information could use tokens that are based on attesting user
credentials. In these kinds of use cases, clients Clients will need to always redeem a
token in order to successfully make a request.</t>
        <t>Many other use cases for Privacy Pass tokens involve open services that must work
with any client, Client, including those that either cannot redeem tokens, tokens or can only sometimes redeem
tokens. For example, a service can use tokens as a way to reduce the incidence of
presenting CAPTCHAs to users. In such use cases, services will regularly encounter
clients
Clients that cannot redeem a token or choose not to. In order to mitigate the risk
of these services relying on always receiving tokens, clients Clients that are capable of
redeeming tokens can ignore token challenges (and instead behave as if they were a client Client
that either doesn't support redeeming tokens or is unable to generate a new token, by not
sending a new request that contains a token to redeem) with some
non-trivial probability. See <xref section="5.1" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/> for further considerations
on
regarding avoiding discriminatory behavior across clients Clients when using Privacy Pass tokens.</t>
        <t>Clients might also choose to not redeem tokens in subsequent requests when the
token challenges indicate erroneous or malicious behavior on the part of the
challenging origin. Origin. For example, if a client's Client's ability to generate tokens via an
attester
Attester and issuer Issuer is limited to a certain rate, a malicious origin Origin could send
an excessive number of token challenges with unique redemption contexts
in order to cause (1)&nbsp;cause the client Client to exhaust its ability to generate new tokens, tokens or
to overwhelm (2)&nbsp;overwhelm issuance servers. The limits here will vary based Based on the specific deployment, the limits here will vary, but clients SHOULD Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> have some implementation-specific policy to minimize the number of tokens that can be retrieved by origins.</t> Origins.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="choosing-between-multiple-challenges">
        <name>Choosing Between between Multiple Challenges</name>
        <t>A single response from an origin Origin can include multiple token challenges.
For example, a set of challenges could include different token types
and issuers, Issuers, to allow clients Clients to choose a preferred issuer Issuer or type.</t>
        <t>If clients Clients choose to respond, clients Clients should satisfy exactly one of
the challenges presented. The choice of which challenge to use for redeeming
tokens is up to client Client policy. This can involve which token types are
supported or preferred, which issuers Issuers are supported or preferred, or whether
or not the client Client is able to use cached tokens based on the redemption context
or origin Origin information in the challenge. See <xref target="caching"/> for more discussion
on token caching. Regardless of how the choice is made, it SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be done in a
consistent manner to ensure that the choice does not reveal information about the
specific client; Client; see <xref section="6.2" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/> for more details on the privacy
implications of issuance consistency.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="origin-behavior">
      <name>Origin Behavior</name>
      <t>Origins choose what token challenges to send to clients, which Clients; these token challenges will vary vary,
depending on the use case and deployment model. The origin Origin chooses
which token types, issuers, Issuers, redemption contexts, and origin info Origin information to include
in challenges. If an origin Origin sends multiple challenges, each challenge SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
be equivalent in terms of acceptability for token redemption, since clients Clients
are free to choose to generate tokens based on any of the challenges.</t>
      <t>Origins ought to consider the time involved in token issuance. Particularly,
a challenge that includes a unique redemption context will prevent a client Client
from using cached tokens, tokens and thus can add more delay before the client Client
is able to redeem a token.</t>
      <t>Origins SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> minimize the number of challenges sent to a particular client Client
context (referred to as the "redemption context" in
<xref section="3.3" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/>), target="RFC9576"/>), to avoid overwhelming clients Clients and issuers Issuers
with token requests that might cause clients Clients to hit rate limits.</t>
      <section anchor="greasing">
        <name>Greasing</name>
        <t>In order to prevent clients Clients from becoming incompatible with new token challenges,
origins SHOULD
Origins <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> include random token types, from the Reserved reserved list of "greased"
types (defined in <xref target="token-types"/>), with some non-trivial probability.</t>
        <t>Additionally, for deployments where tokens are not required (such as when tokens
are used as a way to avoiding avoid showing CAPTCHAs), origins SHOULD randomly
 Origins <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> randomly
choose to not challenge clients Clients for tokens with some non-trivial probability.
This helps origins Origins ensure that their behavior for handling clients Clients that cannot
redeem tokens is maintained and exercised consistently.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="sec-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>This section contains security considerations for the PrivateToken "PrivateToken" authentication
scheme described in this document.</t>
      <section anchor="randomness-requirements">
        <name>Randomness Requirements</name>
        <t>All random values in the challenge and token MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be
generated using a cryptographically secure source of randomness (<xref target="RFC4086"/>).</t> <xref target="RFC4086"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="replay-attacks">
        <name>Replay Attacks</name>
        <t>Applications SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> constrain tokens to a single origin Origin unless the use case can
accommodate replay attacks. Replaying tokens is not necessarily a security
or privacy problem. As an example, it is reasonable for clients Clients to replay tokens
in contexts where token redemption does not induce side effects and in which
client
Client requests are already linkable. One possible setting where this applies
is where tokens are sent as part of 0-RTT data.</t>
        <t>If successful token redemption produces side effects, origins SHOULD Origins <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> implement an
anti-replay mechanism to mitigate the harm of such replays. See <xref section="8" sectionFormat="comma" target="TLS13"/> target="RFC8446"/>
and <xref section="9.2" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9001"/> for details about anti-replay mechanisms, as well as
<xref section="3" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8470"/> for discussion about safety considerations for 0-RTT
HTTP data.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="reflection-attacks">
        <name>Reflection Attacks</name>
        <t>The security properties of token challenges vary vary, depending on whether the
challenge contains a redemption context or not, as well as whether the
challenge is per-origin a per-Origin challenge or not. For example, cross-origin cross-Origin tokens with empty
contexts can be reflected from one party by another, as shown below.</t>

<!-- [rfced] Figure 2:  In the HTML and PDF output files, we see an
ASCII arrow after "(reflect challenge)" as opposed to the SVG-style
arrow used in other parts of the figure.  Should the ASCII arrow be
updated to use the same style?  If yes, please provide the updated
SVG.

Author:  Yes, this probably should be SVG, but I’ll have to get back
to you on the updated SVG. -->

<!-- Removed height="176" width="472" to see if the SVG will display
   correctly in the HTML and PDF outputs. -->

        <figure anchor="fig-replay">
          <name>Replay attack example</name>
          <name>Reflection Attack Example</name>
          <artset>
            <artwork type="svg"><svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" version="1.1" height="176" width="472" viewBox="0 0 472 176" class="diagram" text-anchor="middle" font-family="monospace" font-size="13px" stroke-linecap="round">
                <path d="M 8,32 L 8,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 40,64 L 40,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 80,32 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 176,32 L 176,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,64 L 216,160" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 264,32 L 264,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 392,32 L 392,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 424,64 L 424,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 464,32 L 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 8,32 L 80,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 176,32 L 264,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 392,32 L 464,32" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 8,64 L 80,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 176,64 L 264,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 392,64 L 464,64" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 40,96 L 56,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 192,96 L 208,96" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 216,112 L 232,112" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 224,128 L 288,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 352,128 L 424,128" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <path d="M 48,144 L 64,144" fill="none" stroke="black"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="232,128 220,122.4 220,133.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,224,128)"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="216,96 204,90.4 204,101.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(0,208,96)"/>
                <polygon class="arrowhead" points="56,144 44,138.4 44,149.6" fill="black" transform="rotate(180,48,144)"/>
                <g class="text">
                  <text x="44" y="52">Origin</text>
                  <text x="220" y="52">Attacker</text>
                  <text x="428" y="52">Client</text>
                  <text x="124" y="100">TokenChallenge</text>
                  <text x="276" y="116">(reflect</text>
                  <text x="356" y="116">challenge)</text>
                  <text x="412" y="116">-&gt;</text>
                  <text x="320" y="132">Token</text> y="132">token</text>
                  <text x="108" y="148">(reflect</text>
                  <text x="172" y="148">token)</text>
                  <text x="208" y="148">-</text>
                </g>
              </svg>
            </artwork>
            <artwork type="ascii-art"><![CDATA[
+--------+           +----------+               +--------+
| Origin |           | Attacker |               | Client |
+---+----+           +----+-----+               +---+----+
    |                     |                         |
    +-- TokenChallenge -->|                         |
    |                     +-- (reflect challenge) ->|
    |                     |<-------- Token token ---------+
    |<-- (reflect token) -+                         |
    |                     |
]]></artwork>
          </artset>
        </figure>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-exhaustion-attacks">
        <name>Token Exhaustion Attacks</name>
        <t>When a Client holds cross-origin cross-Origin tokens with empty contexts, it
is possible for any Origin in the cross-origin cross-Origin set to deplete that Client Client's
set of tokens. To prevent this from happening, tokens can be scoped to single
Origins (with non-empty origin_info) such that they can only be redeemed for
a single Origin. Alternatively, if tokens are cross-Origin, cross-Origin tokens, Clients can use
alternate methods to prevent many tokens from being redeemed at once. For
example, if the Origin requests an excess of tokens, the Client could choose to
not present any tokens for verification if a redemption had already
occurred in a given time window.</t>
        <t>Token challenges that include non-empty origin_info bind tokens to one or more
specific origins. Origins. As described in <xref target="challenge"/>, clients target="process-challenge"/>, Clients only accept such
challenges from origin Origin names listed in the origin_info string. string if it is non-empty. Even if multiple
origins
Origins are listed, a token can only be redeemed for an origin Origin if the challenge
has a match for the origin_info. For example, if "a.example.com" issues
a challenge with an origin_info string of "a.example.com,b.example.com", a
client
Client could redeem a token fetched for this challenge if and only if
"b.example.com" also included an origin_info string of
"a.example.com,b.example.com". On the other hand, if "b.example.com" had an
origin_info string of "b.example.com" or "b.example.com,a.example.com" "b.example.com", "b.example.com,a.example.com", or
"a.example.com,b.example.com,c.example.com", the string would not match match, and the
client
Client would need to use a different token.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="timing-correlation-attacks">
        <name>Timing Correlation Attacks</name>
        <t>Context-bound token challenges require clients Clients to obtain matching tokens when
challenged, rather than presenting a token that was obtained from a different
context in the past. This can make it more likely that issuance and redemption
events will occur at approximately the same time. For example, if a client Client is
challenged for a token with a unique context at time T1 and then subsequently
obtains a token at time T2, a colluding issuer Issuer and origin Origin can link this to the
same client Client if T2 is unique to the client. Client. This linkability is less feasible as
the number of issuance events at time T2 increases. Depending on the "max-age"
token challenge parameter, clients MAY Clients <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> try to add delay to the time between
being challenged and redeeming a token to make this sort of linkability more
difficult. For more discussion on correlation risks between token issuance and
redemption, see <xref section="6.3" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/>.</t> target="RFC9576"/>.</t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="cross-context-linkability-attacks">
        <name>Cross-Context Linkability Attacks</name>
        <t>As discussed in <xref target="challenge"/>, clients SHOULD Clients <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> discard any context-bound tokens
upon flushing cookies or changing networks, to prevent an origin Origin from using the
redemption context state as a cookie to recognize clients.</t> Clients.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>

      <section anchor="authentication-scheme">
        <name>Authentication Scheme</name>
        <t>This document registers
        <t>IANA has registered the "PrivateToken" authentication scheme in the
"HTTP Authentication Schemes" subregistry of the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registry" as defined
in <xref section="16.4" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC9110"/>.</t>
        <dl>
          <dt>Authentication Scheme Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>PrivateToken</t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Pointer to specification text:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t><xref target="challenge-redemption"/> of this document</t>
          </dd>
          <dd>PrivateToken</dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>RFC 9577, <xref target="challenge-redemption"/></dd>
        </dl>
      </section>
      <section anchor="token-types">
        <name>Token Type
        <name>Privacy Pass Token Types Registry</name>
        <t>IANA is requested to create has created a new "Privacy Pass Token Type" Types" registry in a new
"Privacy Pass Parameters" Pass" page to list identifiers for issuance protocols
defined for use with the Privacy Pass token authentication scheme. These
identifiers are two-byte 2-byte values, so the maximum possible value is
0xFFFF = 65535.</t>
        <t>New registrations need to list the following attributes:</t>
        <dl spacing="compact">
          <dt>Value:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The two-byte
            The 2-byte identifier for the algorithm</t>
          </dd> algorithm.</dd>
          <dt>Name:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Name
          <dd>Name of the issuance protocol</t>
          </dd> protocol.</dd>
          <dt>Token Structure:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The
          <dd>The contents of the Token structure in token structure; see <xref target="redemption"/></t>
          </dd> target="redemption"/>.</dd>
          <dt>Token Key Encoding:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The
          <dd>The encoding of the "token-key" parameter in parameter; see <xref target="redemption"/></t>
          </dd> target="send-challenge"/>.</dd>
          <dt>TokenChallenge Structure:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The
          <dd>The contents of the TokenChallenge structure in structure; see <xref target="challenge"/></t>
          </dd>
          <dt>Public Verifiability:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A target="challenge"/>.</dd>
          <dt>Publicly Verifiable:</dt>
          <dd>A Y/N value indicating if the output tokens have the
public verifiability property; see <xref section="3.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/>
for more details about this property.</t>
          </dd> property.</dd>
          <dt>Public Metadata:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A
          <dd>A Y/N value indicating if the output tokens can contain
public metadata; see <xref section="3.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/>
for more details about this property.</t>
          </dd> property.</dd>
          <dt>Private Metadata:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>A
          <dd>A Y/N value indicating if the output tokens can contain
private metadata; see <xref section="3.5" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/> target="RFC9576"/>
for more details about this property.</t>
          </dd> property.</dd>
          <dt>Nk:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The
          <dd>The length in bytes of an output authenticator</t>
          </dd> authenticator.</dd>
          <dt>Nid:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>The
          <dd>The length of the token key identifier</t>
          </dd> identifier.</dd>
          <dt>Change Controller:</dt><dd></dd>
          <dt>Reference:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Where
          <dd>Where this algorithm is defined</t>
          </dd> defined.</dd>
          <dt>Notes:</dt>
          <dd>
            <t>Any
          <dd>Any notes associated with the entry</t>
          </dd> entry.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>New entries in this registry are subject to the Specification Required
registration policy (<xref section="4.6" sectionFormat="comma" target="RFC8126"/>). Designated experts need to
ensure that the token type is defined to be used for both token issuance and
redemption. Additionally, the experts can reject registrations on the basis
that they do not meet the security and privacy requirements for issuance
protocols defined in <xref section="3.2" sectionFormat="of" target="ARCHITECTURE"/>.</t> target="RFC9576"/>.</t>
        <t><xref target="ISSUANCE"/> target="RFC9578"/> defines entries for this registry.</t>
        <section anchor="reserved-values">
          <name>Reserved Values</name>
          <t>This document defines several Reserved reserved values, which can be used by clients Clients
and servers to send "greased" values in token challenges and redemptions to
ensure that implementations remain able to handle unknown token types
gracefully (this technique is inspired by <xref target="RFC8701"/>). Implementations SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
select reserved values at random when including them in greased messages.
Servers can include these in TokenChallenge structures, either as the only
challenge when no real token type is desired, desired or as one challenge in a list of
challenges that include real values. Clients can include these in Token token
structures when they are not able to present a real token. The
contents of the Token token structure SHOULD <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> be filled with random bytes when
using greased values.</t>
          <t>The initial contents for of this registry consists consist of multiple reserved values,
with the following attributes, which are repeated for each registration:</t>
          <dl spacing="compact">
            <dt>Value:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>0x0000,
            <dd>0x0000, 0x02AA, 0x1132, 0x2E96, 0x3CD3, 0x4473, 0x5A63, 0x6D32, 0x7F3F,
0x8D07, 0x916B, 0xA6A4, 0xBEAB, 0xC3F3, 0xDA42, 0xE944, 0xF057</t>
            </dd> 0xF057</dd>
            <dt>Name:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>RESERVED</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>RESERVED</dd>
            <dt>Token Structure:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Random bytes</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>Random bytes</dd>
            <dt>Token Key Encoding:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Random bytes</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>Random bytes</dd>
            <dt>TokenChallenge Structure:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>Random bytes</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>Random bytes</dd>
            <dt>Publicly Verifiable:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>N/A</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Public Metadata:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>N/A</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Private Metadata:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>N/A</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Nk:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>N/A</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Nid:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>N/A</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>N/A</dd>
            <dt>Change Controller:</dt>
            <dd>IETF</dd>
            <dt>Reference:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>This document</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>RFC 9577</dd>
            <dt>Notes:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>None</t>
            </dd>
            <dd>None</dd>
          </dl>
        </section>
      </section>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>

    <displayreference target="RFC9576" to="ARCHITECTURE"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC8446" to="TLS13"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC3986" to="URI"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC9578" to="ISSUANCE"/>
    <displayreference target="RFC9110" to="HTTP"/>
    <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis" to="COOKIES"/>

    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>

<!-- draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture (RFC 9576) -->
<reference anchor="ARCHITECTURE"> anchor="RFC9576" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9576">
<front>
<title>The Privacy Pass Architecture</title>
<author fullname="Alex Davidson" initials="A." surname="Davidson">
              <organization>LIP</organization> initials='A' surname='Davidson' fullname='Alex Davidson'>
<organization />
</author>
<author fullname="Jana Iyengar" initials="J." surname="Iyengar">
              <organization>Fastly</organization> initials='J' surname='Iyengar' fullname='Jana Iyengar'>
<organization />
</author>
<author fullname="Christopher initials='C. A.' surname='Wood' fullname='Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood">
              <organization>Cloudflare</organization> Wood'>
<organization />
</author>
<date day="25" month="September" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies the Privacy Pass architecture and
   requirements for its constituent protocols used for authorization
   based on privacy-preserving authentication mechanisms.  It describes
   the conceptual model of Privacy Pass and its protocols, its security
   and privacy goals, practical deployment models, and recommendations
   for each deployment model that helps ensure the desired security and
   privacy goals are fulfilled.

              </t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-architecture-16"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract> year='2024' month='May'/>
</front>
<seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/> value="9576"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="TLS13">
          <front>
            <title>The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3</title>
            <author fullname="E. Rescorla" initials="E." surname="Rescorla"/>
            <date month="August" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery.</t>
              <t>This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8446"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8446"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="URI">
          <front>
            <title>Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax</title>
            <author fullname="T. Berners-Lee" initials="T." surname="Berners-Lee"/>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="L. Masinter" initials="L." surname="Masinter"/>
            <date month="January" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or physical resource. This specification defines the generic URI syntax and a process for resolving URI references that might be in relative form, along with guidelines and security considerations for the use of URIs on the Internet. The URI syntax defines a grammar that is a superset of all valid URIs, allowing an implementation to parse the common components of a URI reference without knowing the scheme-specific requirements of every possible identifier. This specification does not define a generative grammar for URIs; that task is performed by the individual specifications of each URI scheme. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="66"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3986"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3986"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/> value="10.17487/RFC9576"/>
</reference>

<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9110.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8446.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.3986.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4648.xml"/>

        <reference anchor="SHS" target="https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.fips.180-4">
          <front>
            <title>Secure Hash Standard</title>
            <author fullname="Quynh H. Dang" surname="Dang"/> Standard (SHS)</title>
            <author>
              <organization>National Institute of Standards and Technology</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="July" month="August" year="2015"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.6028/nist.fips.180-4"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8126">
          <front>
            <title>Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</title>
            <author fullname="M. Cotton" initials="M." surname="Cotton"/>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <author fullname="T. Narten" initials="T." surname="Narten"/>
            <date month="June" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</t>
              <t>To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry.</t>
              <t>This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="26"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8126"/> name="NIST FIPS Publication" value="180-4"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8126"/> value="10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4"/>
        </reference>

<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8126.xml"/>

      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>

<!-- draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol (RFC 9578) -->
<reference anchor="ISSUANCE"> anchor="RFC9578" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9578">
   <front>
      <title>Privacy Pass Issuance Protocol</title> Protocols</title>
      <author fullname="Sofia Celi" initials="S." surname="Celi"> surname="Celi" fullname="Sofia Celi">
         <organization>Brave Software</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Alex Davidson" initials="A." surname="Davidson"> surname="Davidson" fullname="Alex Davidson">
         <organization>Brave Software</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Steven Valdez" initials="S." surname="Valdez"> surname="Valdez" fullname="Steven Valdez">
         <organization>Google LLC</organization>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Christopher A. Wood" initials="C. A." surname="Wood"> surname="Wood" fullname="Christopher A. Wood">
         <organization>Cloudflare</organization>
      </author>
      <date day="3" month="October" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document specifies two variants of the two-message issuance
   protocol for Privacy Pass tokens: one that produces tokens that are
   privately verifiable using the issuance private key, and another that
   produces tokens that are publicly verifiable using the issuance
   public key.

              </t>
            </abstract> month="May" year="2024"/>
   </front>
<seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-privacypass-protocol-16"/> name="RFC" value="9578"/>
<seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9578"/>
</reference>

<!-- draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis (I-D Exists)
   "Long way" to include editor designations -->
<reference anchor="COOKIES"> anchor="I-D.ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis">
  <front>
    <title>Cookies: HTTP State Management Mechanism</title>
    <author fullname="Steven Bingler" initials="S." surname="Bingler"> surname="Bingler" role="editor">
      <organization>Google LLC</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Mike West" initials="M." surname="West"> surname="West" role="editor">
      <organization>Google LLC</organization>
    </author>
    <author fullname="John Wilander" initials="J." surname="Wilander"> surname="Wilander" role="editor">
      <organization>Apple, Inc</organization>
    </author>
    <date day="10" month="May" day="15" month="November" year="2023"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>   This document defines the HTTP Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields.
   These header fields can be used by HTTP servers to store state
   (called cookies) at HTTP user agents, letting the servers maintain a
   stateful session over the mostly stateless HTTP protocol.  Although
   cookies have many historical infelicities that degrade their security
   and privacy, the Cookie and Set-Cookie header fields are widely used
   on the Internet.  This document obsoletes RFC 6265.

              </t>
            </abstract>
  </front>
  <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-12"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4086">
          <front>
            <title>Randomness Requirements for Security</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schiller" initials="J." surname="Schiller"/>
            <author fullname="S. Crocker" initials="S." surname="Crocker"/>
            <date month="June" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Security systems are built on strong cryptographic algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in pseudo-security. A sophisticated attacker may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced the secret quantities and to search the resulting small set of possibilities than to locate the quantities in the whole of the potential number space.</t>
              <t>Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated adversary is surprisingly difficult. This document points out many pitfalls in using poor entropy sources or traditional pseudo-random number generation techniques for generating such quantities. It recommends the use of truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not available, and it gives examples of how large such quantities need to be for some applications. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="106"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4086"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4086"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9001">
          <front>
            <title>Using TLS to Secure QUIC</title>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Thomson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Turner" initials="S." role="editor" surname="Turner"/>
            <date month="May" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure QUIC.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9001"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9001"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8470">
          <front>
            <title>Using Early Data in HTTP</title>
            <author fullname="M. Thomson" initials="M." surname="Thomson"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="W. Tarreau" initials="W." surname="Tarreau"/>
            <date month="September" year="2018"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>Using TLS early data creates an exposure to the possibility of a replay attack. This document defines mechanisms that allow clients to communicate with servers about HTTP requests that are sent in early data. Techniques are described that use these mechanisms to mitigate the risk of replay.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8470"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8470"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8701">
          <front>
            <title>Applying Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility (GREASE) to TLS Extensibility</title>
            <author fullname="D. Benjamin" initials="D." surname="Benjamin"/>
            <date month="January" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This document describes GREASE (Generate Random Extensions And Sustain Extensibility), a mechanism to prevent extensibility failures in the TLS ecosystem. It reserves a set of TLS protocol values that may be advertised to ensure peers correctly handle unknown values.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8701"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8701"/> value="draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis-13"/>
</reference>

<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.4086.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.9001.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8470.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://bib.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8701.xml"/>

      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="test-vectors">
      <name>Test Vectors</name>
      <t>This section includes test vectors for the HTTP authentication scheme specified
in this document. It consists of the following types of test vectors:</t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>Test vectors for the challenge and redemption protocols. Implementations can
use these test vectors for verifying code that builds and encodes
TokenChallenge structures, as well as code that produces a well-formed Token token
bound to a TokenChallenge.</li>
        <li>Test vectors for the HTTP headers used for authentication. Implementations
can use these test vectors for validating whether they parse HTTP
authentication headers correctly to produce TokenChallenge structures and the
other associated parameters, such as the token-key and max-age values.</li>
      </ol>
      <section anchor="challenge-and-redemption-structure-test-vectors">
        <name>Challenge and Redemption Structure Test Vectors</name>
        <t>This section includes test vectors for the challenge and redemption
functionalities described in <xref target="challenge"/> Sections&nbsp;<xref target="challenge" format="counter"/> and <xref target="redemption"/>. target="redemption" format="counter"/>. Each test vector
lists the following values:</t>
        <ul
        <dl spacing="normal">
          <li>token_type: The
          <dt>token_type:</dt><dd>The type of token issuance protocol, protocol -- a value from
<xref target="token-types"/>. For these test vectors, token_type is 0x0002, corresponding
to the issuance protocol discussed in Section <xref target="ISSUANCE"/>.</li>
          <li>issuer_name: target="RFC9578" sectionFormat="bare" section="6">"Issuance Protocol for Publicly Verifiable Tokens"</xref> of <xref target="RFC9578"/>.</dd>
          <dt>issuer_name:</dt><dd> The name of the issuer Issuer in the TokenChallenge structure,
represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>
          <li>redemption_context: The string.</dd>
          <dt>redemption_context:</dt><dd>The redemption context in the TokenChallenge structure,
represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>
          <li>origin_info: string.</dd>
          <dt>origin_info:</dt><dd> The origin info Origin information in the TokenChallenge structure, represented as
a hexadecimal string.</li>
          <li>nonce: The string.</dd>
          <dt>nonce:</dt><dd>The nonce in the Token token structure, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>
          <li>token_key: The string.</dd>
	  <dt>token_key_id:</dt><dd>The public token-key, token key, encoded based on the corresponding token
type, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>
          <li>token_authenticator_input: The string.</dd>
          <dt>token_authenticator_input:</dt><dd>The values in the Token token structure used to compute
the Token token authenticator value, represented as a hexadecimal string.</li>
        </ul> string.</dd>
        </dl>
        <t>Test vectors are provided for each of the following TokenChallenge
configurations:</t>
        <ol spacing="normal" type="1"><li>TokenChallenge with a single origin Origin and non-empty redemption context</li> context.</li>
          <li>TokenChallenge with a single origin Origin and empty redemption context</li> context.</li>
          <li>TokenChallenge with an empty origin Origin and redemption context</li> context.</li>
          <li>TokenChallenge with an empty origin Origin and non-empty redemption context</li> context.</li>
          <li>TokenChallenge with a multiple origins Origins and non-empty redemption context</li> context.</li>
          <li>TokenChallenge for greasing</li> greasing.</li>
        </ol>
        <t>These test vectors are below.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
// Test vector 1:
//   token_type(0002), issuer_name(issuer.example),
//   origin_info(origin.example), redemption_context(non-empty)
token_type: 0002
issuer_name: 6973737565722e6578616d706c65
redemption_context:
476ac2c935f458e9b2d7af32dacfbd22dd6023ef5887a789f1abe004e79bb5bb
origin_info: 6f726967696e2e6578616d706c65
nonce:
e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee186568614f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab
token_key_id:
ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708
token_authenticator_input: 0002e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee1865686
14f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab8e1d5518ec82964255526efd8f9db88205a
8ddd3ffb1db298fcc3ad36c42388fca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147
266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708

// Test vector 2:
//   token_type(0002), issuer_name(issuer.example),
//   origin_info(origin.example), redemption_context(empty)
token_type: 0002
issuer_name: 6973737565722e6578616d706c65
redemption_context:
origin_info: 6f726967696e2e6578616d706c65
nonce:
e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee186568614f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab
token_key_id:
ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708
token_authenticator_input: 0002e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee1865686
14f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab11e15c91a7c2ad02abd66645802373db1d8
23bea80f08d452541fb2b62b5898bca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147
266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708

// Test vector 3:
//   token_type(0002), issuer_name(issuer.example),
//   origin_info(), redemption_context(empty)
token_type: 0002
issuer_name: 6973737565722e6578616d706c65
redemption_context:
origin_info:
nonce:
e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee186568614f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab
token_key_id:
ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708
token_authenticator_input: 0002e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee1865686
14f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688ababb741ec1b6fd05f1e95f8982906aec161289
6d9ca97d53eef94ad3c9fe023f7a4ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147
266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708

// Test vector 4:
//   token_type(0002), issuer_name(issuer.example),
//   origin_info(), redemption_context(non-empty)
token_type: 0002
issuer_name: 6973737565722e6578616d706c65
redemption_context:
476ac2c935f458e9b2d7af32dacfbd22dd6023ef5887a789f1abe004e79bb5bb
origin_info:
nonce:
e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee186568614f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab
token_key_id:
ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708
token_authenticator_input: 0002e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee1865686
14f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688ababb85fb5bc06edeb0e8e8bdb5b3bea8c4fa40
837c82e8bcaf5882c81e14817ea18ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147
266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708

// Test vector 5:
//   token_type(0002), issuer_name(issuer.example),
//   origin_info(foo.example,bar.example),
//   redemption_context(non-empty)
token_type: 0002
issuer_name: 6973737565722e6578616d706c65
redemption_context:
476ac2c935f458e9b2d7af32dacfbd22dd6023ef5887a789f1abe004e79bb5bb
origin_info: 666f6f2e6578616d706c652c6261722e6578616d706c65
nonce:
e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee186568614f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688abab
token_key_id:
ca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708
token_authenticator_input: 0002e01978182c469e5e026d66558ee1865686
14f235e41ef7e2378e6f202688ababa2a775866b6ae0f98944910c8f48728d8a2
735b9157762ddbf803f70e2e8ba3eca572f8982a9ca248a3056186322d93ca147
266121ddeb5632c07f1f71cd2708

// Test vector 6:
//   token_type(0000), structure(random_bytes)
token_type: 0000
token_authenticator_input: 000058405ad31e286e874cb42d0ef9d50461ae
703bb71a21178beb429c43c0effe587456d856f0f2bdfc216ef93d5c225e2a93e
84cb686e63919788087f7ab1054aa817f09dcb919a0ed6f90fe887e8b08cd1eee
44d5be8d813eda9f2656db61c932db8d73f8690604ded0120157923bbd19d5549
e639e4de07530aee1d370f5187b678685715bd878dde24346751eb532a87b71ea
40bbe5a13218658e303c648eb03817453690bfcbe8255081bf27ff0891cd02ee2
483e48a2c494bdef696f943fa992a65303292c25d0d3f62da86a70d0b020f0ff5
b90d0ff0f6abdb097d321fde04f3a1994e63bcd35a88c21236c7dc67600482223
f54b25e39a250439f27ecb5ae9eb8ed548a3ec1f1d6f510d08281929c8fe08834
2959e35ea9b3b6f6a96fc1a8edba4ed297f4cf02d0e4482b79a11f671745d7b7d
b120eddd8a4c2b6501bbc895b2160b8071615d9c1b18f32e056bfee29deac6a7d
6cf7b522a5badd63b9cb
]]></artwork>
      </section>
      <section anchor="http-header-test-vectors">
        <name>HTTP Header Test Vectors</name>
        <t>This section includes test vectors for the contents of the HTTP authentication
headers. Each test vector consists of one or more challenges that comprise
a WWW-Authenticate header, as defined in {(choosing-between-multiple-challenges}}. header; see
<xref  target="choosing-between-multiple-challenges"/>.
For each challenge, the token-type, token-key, max-age, and token-challenge
parameters are listed. Each challenge also includes an unknown (not specified) (unspecified)
parameter that implementations are meant to ignore.</t>
        <t>The parameters for each challenge are indexed by their position
in the WWW-Authentication WWW-Authenticate challenge list. For example, token-key-0 denotes
the token-key parameter for the first challenge in the list, whereas
token-key-1 denotes the token-key for the second challenge in the list.</t>
        <t>The resulting wire-encoded WWW-Authentication WWW-Authenticate header based on this
list of challenges is then listed at the end. Line folding is only
used to fit the document formatting document-formatting constraints and is not supported
in actual requests.</t>
        <t>The last challenge on in this list includes Basic authentication, a grease
challenge, and a valid challenge for token type <tt>0x0001</tt>. Correct client Client
implementations will ignore the Basic and grease challenges.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
token-type-0: 0x0002
token-key-0: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b060960864
8016503040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b060960864801650304020
2a2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab2
5b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4b6c9
ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c500a78a2f
67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce453b526ef9b
f6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c732db68a181c6c
bbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b1dba9e828bbd81e2
91317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073fe49740c01f00e109106
066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9babd612d03cad02db134b7
e225a5f0203010001
max-age-0: 10
token-challenge-0: 0002000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65208a3e83a33d9
8005d2f30bef419fa6bf4cd5c6005e36b1285bbb4ccd40fa4b383000e6f726967696
e2e6578616d706c65

WWW-Authenticate: PrivateToken challenge="AAIADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlII
o-g6M9mABdLzC-9Bn6a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhhbXBsZQ==",
 token-key="MIIBUjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAqEaMBgGCSqG
SIb3DQEBCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgKiAwIBMAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyxrta2qV9bHOATpM
_KsluUsuZKIwNOQlCn6rQ8DfOowSmTrxKxEZCNS0cb7DHUtsmtnN2pBhKi7pA1I-beWi
JNawLwnlw3TQz-Adj1KcUAp4ovZ5CPpoK1orQwyB6vGvcte155T8mKMTknaHl1fORTtS
bvm_bOuZl5uEI7kPRGGiKvN6qwz1cz91l6vkTTHHMttooYHGy75gfYwOUuBlX9mZbcWE
7KC-h6-814ozfRex26noKLvYHikTFxROf_ifVWGXCbCWy7nqR0zq0mTCBz_kl0DAHwDh
CRBgZpg9IeX4PwhuLoI8h5zUPO9wDSo1Kpur1hLQPK0C2xNLfiJaXwIDAQAB",unknow
nChallengeAttribute="ignore-me", max-age="10"

token-type-0: 0x0002
token-key-0: 30820152303d06092a864886f70d01010a3030a00d300b060960864
8016503040202a11a301806092a864886f70d010108300b060960864801650304020
2a2030201300382010f003082010a0282010100cb1aed6b6a95f5b1ce013a4cfcab2
5b94b2e64a23034e4250a7eab43c0df3a8c12993af12b111908d4b471bec31d4b6c9
ad9cdda90612a2ee903523e6de5a224d6b02f09e5c374d0cfe01d8f529c500a78a2f
67908fa682b5a2b430c81eaf1af72d7b5e794fc98a3139276879757ce453b526ef9b
f6ceb99979b8423b90f4461a22af37aab0cf5733f7597abe44d31c732db68a181c6c
bbe607d8c0e52e0655fd9996dc584eca0be87afbcd78a337d17b1dba9e828bbd81e2
91317144e7ff89f55619709b096cbb9ea474cead264c2073fe49740c01f00e109106
066983d21e5f83f086e2e823c879cd43cef700d2a352a9babd612d03cad02db134b7
e225a5f0203010001
max-age-0: 10
token-challenge-0: 0002000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65208a3e83a33d9
8005d2f30bef419fa6bf4cd5c6005e36b1285bbb4ccd40fa4b383000e6f726967696
e2e6578616d706c65
token-type-1: 0x0001
token-key-1: ebb1fed338310361c08d0c7576969671296e05e99a17d7926dfc28a
53fabd489fac0f82bca86249a668f3a5bfab374c9
max-age-1: 10
token-challenge-1: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65208a3e83a33d9
8005d2f30bef419fa6bf4cd5c6005e36b1285bbb4ccd40fa4b383000e6f726967696
e2e6578616d706c65

WWW-Authenticate: PrivateToken challenge="AAIADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlII
o-g6M9mABdLzC-9Bn6a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhhbXBsZQ==",
 token-key="MIIBUjA9BgkqhkiG9w0BAQowMKANMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQCAqEaMBgGCSqG
SIb3DQEBCDALBglghkgBZQMEAgKiAwIBMAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAyxrta2qV9bHOATpM
_KsluUsuZKIwNOQlCn6rQ8DfOowSmTrxKxEZCNS0cb7DHUtsmtnN2pBhKi7pA1I-beWi
JNawLwnlw3TQz-Adj1KcUAp4ovZ5CPpoK1orQwyB6vGvcte155T8mKMTknaHl1fORTtS
bvm_bOuZl5uEI7kPRGGiKvN6qwz1cz91l6vkTTHHMttooYHGy75gfYwOUuBlX9mZbcWE
7KC-h6-814ozfRex26noKLvYHikTFxROf_ifVWGXCbCWy7nqR0zq0mTCBz_kl0DAHwDh
CRBgZpg9IeX4PwhuLoI8h5zUPO9wDSo1Kpur1hLQPK0C2xNLfiJaXwIDAQAB",unknow
nChallengeAttribute="ignore-me", max-age="10", PrivateToken challeng
e="AAEADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlIIo-g6M9mABdLzC-9Bn6a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPp
LODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhhbXBsZQ==", token-key="67H-0zgxA2HAjQx1dpaWcSluBem
aF9eSbfwopT-r1In6wPgryoYkmmaPOlv6s3TJ",unknownChallengeAttribute="ig
nore-me", max-age="10"

token-type-0: 0x0000
token-key-0: 856de3c710b892e7cca1ae5eb121af42ca8e779137a11224228c9b9
9b0729bf84d5057d030000309b8f0d06ccffa17561f9eacd4c312e985a6bc60ffbea
0610264dcb1726255313da81d665692686a1d8644f1516bf612cea009e6dff6d9a9a
959fb538e1b5b2343c092992942382bdde22d5b324b1e4618ed21d7806286c2ce
token-challenge-0: 0000acc3b25795c636fd9dd8b12982394abba8777d35978e8
77fc8848892a217233045ac25a3d55c07c54efe6372973fee0073e77fc61bf19ab88
0f20edf5d627502
token-type-1: 0x0001
token-key-1: ebb1fed338310361c08d0c7576969671296e05e99a17d7926dfc28a
53fabd489fac0f82bca86249a668f3a5bfab374c9
max-age-1: 10
token-challenge-1: 0001000e6973737565722e6578616d706c65208a3e83a33d9
8005d2f30bef419fa6bf4cd5c6005e36b1285bbb4ccd40fa4b383000e6f726967696
e2e6578616d706c65

WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="grease", PrivateToken challenge="AACs
w7JXlcY2_Z3YsSmCOUq7qHd9NZeOh3_IhIiSohcjMEWsJaPVXAfFTv5jcpc_7gBz53_G
G_GauIDyDt9dYnUC",token-key="hW3jxxC4kufMoa5esSGvQsqOd5E3oRIkIoybmbB
G_GauIDyDt9dYnUC", token-key="hW3jxxC4kufMoa5esSGvQsqOd5E3oRIkIoybmbB
ym_hNUFfQMAADCbjw0GzP-hdWH56s1MMS6YWmvGD_vqBhAmTcsXJiVTE9qB1mVpJoah2
GRPFRa_YSzqAJ5t_22ampWftTjhtbI0PAkpkpQjgr3eItWzJLHkYY7SHXgGKGws4=",
PrivateToken challenge="AAEADmlzc3Vlci5leGFtcGxlIIo-g6M9mABdLzC-9Bn6
a_TNXGAF42sShbu0zNQPpLODAA5vcmlnaW4uZXhhbXBsZQ==", token-key="67H-0z
gxA2HAjQx1dpaWcSluBemaF9eSbfwopT-r1In6wPgryoYkmmaPOlv6s3TJ",unknownC
hallengeAttribute="ignore-me", max-age="10"
]]></artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
  </back>

<!-- ##markdown-source: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 [rfced] Quoting of some items is applied inconsistently in this
document.  Please let us know which form is preferred.

 "token_type" / token_type (e.g., 'the token_type', 'relationship
    between "token_type" and')
    Please compare with usage for "issuer_name", "redemption_context",
    and "origin_info".

 "WWW-Authenticate" header field / WWW-Authenticate header field

Author asked about using code font.  Lots of updates, so am waiting
for confirmation to go ahead. -->

</rfc>