Internet-Draft PQC in OpenPGP October 2024
Kousidis, et al. Expires 24 April 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
Network Working Group
Internet-Draft:
draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-05
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
S. Kousidis
BSI
J. Roth
MTG AG
F. Strenzke
MTG AG
A. Wussler
Proton AG

Post-Quantum Cryptography in OpenPGP

Abstract

This document defines a post-quantum public-key algorithm extension for the OpenPGP protocol. Given the generally assumed threat of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer, this extension provides a basis for long-term secure OpenPGP signatures and ciphertexts. Specifically, it defines composite public-key encryption based on ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber), composite public-key signatures based on ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium), both in combination with elliptic curve cryptography, and SLH-DSA (formerly SPHINCS+) as a standalone public key signature scheme.

About This Document

This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

Status information for this document may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc/.

Discussion of this document takes place on the WG Working Group mailing list (mailto:openpgp@ietf.org), which is archived at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/openpgp/. Subscribe at https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/openpgp/.

Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at https://github.com/openpgp-pqc/draft-openpgp-pqc.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 24 April 2025.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The OpenPGP protocol supports various traditional public-key algorithms based on the factoring or discrete logarithm problem. As the security of algorithms based on these mathematical problems is endangered by the advent of quantum computers, there is a need to extend OpenPGP by algorithms that remain secure in the presence of quantum computers.

Such cryptographic algorithms are referred to as post-quantum cryptography. The algorithms defined in this extension were chosen for standardization by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in mid 2022 [NISTIR-8413] as the result of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process initiated in 2016 [NIST-PQC]. Namely, these are ML-KEM [FIPS-203] as a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM), a KEM being a modern building block for public-key encryption, and ML-DSA [FIPS-204] as well as SLH-DSA [FIPS-205] as signature schemes.

For the two ML-* schemes, this document follows the conservative strategy to deploy post-quantum in combination with traditional schemes such that the security is retained even if all schemes but one in the combination are broken. In contrast, the stateless hash-based signature scheme SLH-DSA is considered to be sufficiently well understood with respect to its security assumptions in order to be used standalone. To this end, this document specifies the following new set: SLH-DSA standalone and the two ML-* as composite with ECC-based KEM and digital signature schemes. Here, the term "composite" indicates that any data structure or algorithm pertaining to the combination of the two components appears as single data structure or algorithm from the protocol perspective.

The document specifies the conventions for interoperability between compliant OpenPGP implementations that make use of this extension and the newly defined algorithms or algorithm combinations.

1.1. Conventions used in this Document

1.1.1. Terminology for Multi-Algorithm Schemes

The terminology in this document is oriented towards the definitions in [I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]. Specifically, the terms "multi-algorithm", "composite" and "non-composite" are used in correspondence with the definitions therein. The abbreviation "PQ" is used for post-quantum schemes. To denote the combination of post-quantum and traditional schemes, the abbreviation "PQ/T" is used. The short form "PQ(/T)" stands for PQ or PQ/T.

1.2. Post-Quantum Cryptography

This section describes the individual post-quantum cryptographic schemes. All schemes listed here are believed to provide security in the presence of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. However, the mathematical problems on which the two ML-* schemes and SLH-DSA are based, are fundamentally different, and accordingly the level of trust commonly placed in them as well as their performance characteristics vary.

[Note to the reader: This specification refers to the NIST PQC draft standards FIPS 203, FIPS 204, and FIPS 205 as if they were a final specification. This is a temporary solution until the final versions of these documents are available. The goal is to provide a sufficiently precise specification of the algorithms already at the draft stage of this specification, so that it is possible for implementers to create interoperable implementations. Furthermore, we want to point out that, depending on possible future changes to the draft standards by NIST, this specification may be updated as soon as corresponding information becomes available.]

1.2.1. ML-KEM

ML-KEM [FIPS-203] is based on the hardness of solving the Learning with Errors problem in module lattices (MLWE). The scheme is believed to provide security against cryptanalytic attacks by classical as well as quantum computers. This specification defines ML-KEM only in composite combination with ECDH encryption schemes in order to provide a pre-quantum security fallback.

1.2.2. ML-DSA

ML-DSA [FIPS-204] is a signature scheme that, like ML-KEM, is based on the hardness of solving the Learning With Errors problem and a variant of the Short Integer Solution problem in module lattices (MLWE and SelfTargetMSIS). Accordingly, this specification only defines ML-DSA in composite combination with EdDSA signature schemes.

1.2.3. SLH-DSA

SLH-DSA [FIPS-205] is a stateless hash-based signature scheme. Its security relies on the hardness of finding preimages for cryptographic hash functions. This feature is generally considered to be a high security guarantee. Therefore, this specification defines SLH-DSA as a standalone signature scheme.

In deployments the performance characteristics of SLH-DSA should be taken into account. We refer to Section 10.1 for a discussion of the performance characteristics of this scheme.

1.3. Elliptic Curve Cryptography

The ECDH encryption is defined here as a KEM via X25519 and X448 which are defined in [RFC7748]. EdDSA as defined in [RFC8032] is used as the elliptic curve-based digital signature scheme.

1.4. Standalone and Multi-Algorithm Schemes

This section provides a categorization of the new algorithms and their combinations.

1.4.1. Standalone and Composite Multi-Algorithm Schemes

This specification introduces new cryptographic schemes, which can be categorized as follows:

  • PQ/T multi-algorithm public-key encryption, namely a composite combination of ML-KEM with an ECDH KEM,

  • PQ/T multi-algorithm digital signature, namely composite combinations of ML-DSA with EdDSA signature schemes,

  • PQ digital signature, namely SLH-DSA as a standalone cryptographic algorithm.

For each of the composite schemes, this specification mandates that the consuming party has to successfully perform the cryptographic algorithms for each of the component schemes used in a cryptographic message, in order for the message to be deciphered and considered as valid. This means that all component signatures must be verified successfully in order to achieve a successful verification of the composite signature. In the case of the composite public-key decryption, each of the component KEM decapsulation operations must succeed.

1.4.2. Non-Composite Algorithm Combinations

As the OpenPGP protocol [RFC9580] allows for multiple signatures to be applied to a single message, it is also possible to realize non-composite combinations of signatures. Furthermore, multiple OpenPGP signatures may be combined on the application layer. These latter two cases realize non-composite combinations of signatures. Section 3.3 specifies how implementations should handle the verification of such combinations of signatures.

Furthermore, the OpenPGP protocol also allows parallel encryption to different keys by using multiple PKESK packets, thus realizing non-composite multi-algorithm public-key encryption.

2. Supported Public Key Algorithms

This section specifies the composite ML-KEM + ECDH and ML-DSA + EdDSA schemes as well as the standalone SLH-DSA signature scheme. All of these schemes are fully specified via their algorithm ID, i.e., they are not parametrized.

2.1. Algorithm Specifications

For encryption, the following composite KEM schemes are specified:

Table 1: KEM algorithm specifications
ID Algorithm Requirement Definition
TBD (105 for testing) ML-KEM-768+X25519 MUST Section 4.2
TBD (106 for testing) ML-KEM-1024+X448 SHOULD Section 4.2

For signatures, the following (composite) signature schemes are specified:

Table 2: Signature algorithm specifications
ID Algorithm Requirement Definition
TBD (107 for testing) ML-DSA-65+Ed25519 MUST Section 5.2
TBD (108 for testing) ML-DSA-87+Ed448 SHOULD Section 5.2
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s MAY Section 6.1
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f MAY Section 6.1
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s MAY Section 6.1

2.1.1. Experimental Codepoints for Interop Testing

[ Note: this section to be removed before publication ]

Algorithms indicated as MAY are not assigned a codepoint in the current state of the draft in order to leave enough private/experimental code points available for other drafts.

The use of private/experimental codepoints during development are intended to be used in non-released software only, for experimentation and interop testing purposes only. An OpenPGP implementation MUST NOT produce a formal release using these experimental codepoints. This draft will not be sent to IANA without every listed algorithm having a non-experimental codepoint.

3. Algorithm Combinations

3.1. Composite KEMs

The ML-KEM + ECDH public-key encryption involves both the ML-KEM and an ECDH KEM in an a priori non-separable manner. This is achieved via KEM combination, i.e. both key encapsulations/decapsulations are performed in parallel, and the resulting key shares are fed into a key combiner to produce a single shared secret for message encryption.

As explained in Section 1.4.2, the OpenPGP protocol inherently supports parallel encryption to different keys. Note that the confidentiality of a message is not post-quantum secure when encrypting to different keys if at least one key does not support PQ/T encryption schemes. In Section 8.1 it is explained how to deal with multiple key scenarios.

3.2. Composite Signatures

The ML-DSA + EdDSA signature consists of independent ML-DSA and EdDSA signatures, and an implementation MUST successfully validate both signatures to state that the ML-DSA + EdDSA signature is valid.

3.3. Multiple Signatures

The OpenPGP message format allows multiple signatures of a message, i.e. the attachment of multiple signature packets.

An implementation MAY sign a message with a traditional key and a PQ(/T) key from the same sender. This ensures backwards compatibility due to [RFC9580, Section 5.2.5], since a legacy implementation without PQ(/T) support can fall back on the traditional signature.

Newer implementations with PQ(/T) support MAY ignore the traditional signature(s) during validation.

Implementations SHOULD consider the message correctly signed if at least one of the non-ignored signatures validates successfully.

[Note to the reader: The last requirement, that one valid signature is sufficient to identify a message as correctly signed, is an interpretation of [RFC9580, Section 5.2.5].]

3.4. ECC requirements

Even though the zero point, also called the point at infinity, may occur as a result of arithmetic operations on points of an elliptic curve, it MUST NOT appear in any ECC data structure defined in this document.

Furthermore, when performing the explicitly listed operations in Section 4.1.1.1 or Section 4.1.1.2 it is REQUIRED to follow the specification and security advisory mandated from the respective elliptic curve specification.

4. Composite KEM schemes

4.1. Building Blocks

4.1.1. ECDH KEMs

In this section we define the encryption, decryption, and data formats for the ECDH component of the composite algorithms.

Table 3 describes the ECDH-KEM parameters and artifact lengths. The artifacts in Table 3 follow the encodings described in [RFC7748].

Table 3: Montgomery curves parameters and artifact lengths
  X25519 X448
Algorithm ID reference TBD (105 for testing) TBD (106 for testing)
Field size 32 octets 56 octets
ECDH-KEM x25519Kem (Section 4.1.1.1) x448Kem (Section 4.1.1.2)
ECDH public key 32 octets [RFC7748] 56 octets [RFC7748]
ECDH secret key 32 octets [RFC7748] 56 octets [RFC7748]
ECDH ephemeral 32 octets [RFC7748] 56 octets [RFC7748]
ECDH share 32 octets [RFC7748] 56 octets [RFC7748]
Key share 32 octets 64 octets
Hash SHA3-256 SHA3-512

The various procedures to perform the operations of an ECDH KEM are defined in the following subsections. Specifically, each of these subsections defines the instances of the following operations:

(ecdhCipherText, ecdhKeyShare) <- ECDH-KEM.Encaps(ecdhPublicKey)

and

(ecdhKeyShare) <- ECDH-KEM.Decaps(ecdhSecretKey, ecdhCipherText, ecdhPublicKey)

To instantiate ECDH-KEM, one must select a parameter set from Table 3.

4.1.1.1. X25519-KEM

The encapsulation and decapsulation operations of x25519kem are described using the function X25519() and encodings defined in [RFC7748]. The ecdhSecretKey is denoted as r, the ecdhPublicKey as R, they are subject to the equation R = X25519(r, U(P)). Here, U(P) denotes the u-coordinate of the base point of Curve25519.

The operation x25519Kem.Encaps() is defined as follows:

  1. Generate an ephemeral key pair {v, V} via V = X25519(v,U(P)) where v is a randomly generated octet string with a length of 32 octets

  2. Compute the shared coordinate X = X25519(v, R) where R is the recipient's public key ecdhPublicKey

  3. Set the output ecdhCipherText to V

  4. Set the output ecdhKeyShare to SHA3-256(X || ecdhCipherText || ecdhPublicKey)

The operation x25519Kem.Decaps() is defined as follows:

  1. Compute the shared coordinate X = X25519(r, V), where r is the ecdhSecretKey and V is the ecdhCipherText

  2. Set the output ecdhKeyShare to SHA3-256(X || ecdhCipherText || ecdhPublicKey)

4.1.1.2. X448-KEM

The encapsulation and decapsulation operations of x448kem are described using the function X448() and encodings defined in [RFC7748]. The ecdhSecretKey is denoted as r, the ecdhPublicKey as R, they are subject to the equation R = X25519(r, U(P)). Here, U(P) denotes the u-coordinate of the base point of Curve448.

The operation x448.Encaps() is defined as follows:

  1. Generate an ephemeral key pair {v, V} via V = X448(v,U(P)) where v is a randomly generated octet string with a length of 56 octets

  2. Compute the shared coordinate X = X448(v, R) where R is the recipient's public key ecdhPublicKey

  3. Set the output ecdhCipherText to V

  4. Set the output ecdhKeyShare to SHA3-512(X || ecdhCipherText || ecdhPublicKey)

The operation x448Kem.Decaps() is defined as follows:

  1. Compute the shared coordinate X = X448(r, V), where r is the ecdhSecretKey and V is the ecdhCipherText

  2. Set the output ecdhKeyShare to SHA3-512(X || ecdhCipherText || ecdhPublicKey)

4.1.2. ML-KEM

ML-KEM features the following operations:

(mlkemCipherText, mlkemKeyShare) <- ML-KEM.Encaps(mlkemPublicKey)

and

(mlkemKeyShare) <- ML-KEM.Decaps(mlkemCipherText, mlkemSecretKey)

The above are the operations ML-KEM.Encaps and ML-KEM.Decaps defined in [FIPS-203]. Note that mlkemPublicKey is the encapsulation and mlkemSecretKey is the decapsulation key.

ML-KEM has the parametrization with the corresponding artifact lengths in octets as given in Table 4. All artifacts are encoded as defined in [FIPS-203].

Table 4: ML-KEM parameters artifact lengths in octets
Algorithm ID reference ML-KEM Public key Secret key Ciphertext Key share
TBD (105 for testing) ML-KEM-768 1184 64 1088 32
TBD (106 for testing) ML-KEM-1024 1568 64 1568 32

To instantiate ML-KEM, one must select a parameter set from the column "ML-KEM" of Table 4.

The procedure to perform ML-KEM.Encaps() is as follows:

  1. Invoke (mlkemCipherText, mlkemKeyShare) <- ML-KEM.Encaps(mlkemPublicKey), where mlkemPublicKey is the recipient's public key

  2. Set mlkemCipherText as the ML-KEM ciphertext

  3. Set mlkemKeyShare as the ML-KEM symmetric key share

The procedure to perform ML-KEM.Decaps() is as follows:

  1. Invoke mlkemKeyShare <- ML-KEM.Decaps(mlkemCipherText, mlkemSecretKey)

  2. Set mlkemKeyShare as the ML-KEM symmetric key share

4.2. Composite Encryption Schemes with ML-KEM

Table 1 specifies the following ML-KEM + ECDH composite public-key encryption schemes:

Table 5: ML-KEM + ECDH composite schemes
Algorithm ID reference ML-KEM ECDH-KEM
TBD (105 for testing) ML-KEM-768 x25519Kem
TBD (106 for testing) ML-KEM-1024 x448Kem

The ML-KEM + ECDH composite public-key encryption schemes are built according to the following principal design:

  • The ML-KEM encapsulation algorithm is invoked to create an ML-KEM ciphertext together with an ML-KEM symmetric key share.

  • The encapsulation algorithm of an ECDH KEM, namely X25519-KEM or X448-KEM, is invoked to create an ECDH ciphertext together with an ECDH symmetric key share.

  • A Key-Encryption-Key (KEK) is computed as the output of a key combiner that receives as input both of the above created symmetric key shares and the protocol binding information.

  • The session key for content encryption is then wrapped as described in [RFC3394] using AES-256 as algorithm and the KEK as key.

  • The PKESK packet's algorithm-specific parts are made up of the ML-KEM ciphertext, the ECDH ciphertext, and the wrapped session key.

4.2.1. Key combiner

For the composite KEM schemes defined in Table 1 the following procedure MUST be used to compute the KEK that wraps a session key. The construction is a key derivation function compliant to [SP800-108], Section 4.4, based on KMAC256. It is given by the following algorithm, which computes the key encryption key KEK that is used to wrap, i.e., encrypt, the session key.

//   multiKeyCombine(mlkemKeyShare, mlkemCipherText, mlkemPublicKey, ecdhKeyShare,
//                   ecdhCipherText, ecdhPublicKey, algId)
//
//   Input:
//   mlkemKeyShare   - the ML-KEM key share encoded as an octet string
//   mlkemCipherText - the ML-KEM ciphertext encoded as an octet string
//   mlkemPublicKey  - The ML-KEM public key of the recipient as an octet string
//   ecdhKeyShare    - the ECDH key share encoded as an octet string
//   ecdhCipherText  - the ECDH ciphertext encoded as an octet string
//   ecdhPublicKey   - The ECDH public key of the recipient as an octet string
//   algId           - the OpenPGP algorithm ID of the public-key encryption algorithm
//   domSep          – the UTF-8 encoding of the string "OpenPGPCompositeKDFv1"
//
//  domSep given in hexadecimal encoding := 4F 70 65 6E 50 47 50 43 6F 6D 70
//                                          6F 73 69 74 65 4B 44 46 76 31

KEK = KMAC256(mlkemKeyShare || ecdhKeyShare, mlkemCipherText || ecdhCipherText
              || mlkemPublicKey || ecdhPublicKey || algId, 256, domSep)
return KEK

Here, the parameters to KMAC256 appear in the order as specified in [SP800-185], Section 4, i.e., the key K, main input data X, requested output length in bits L, and optional customization string S.

Note that the values ecdhKeyShare defined in Section 4.1.1 and mlkemKeyShare defined in Section 4.1.2 already use the relative ciphertext in the derivation. The ciphertext and public keys are by design included again in the key combiner to provide a robust security proof.

4.2.2. Key generation procedure

The implementation MUST generate the ML-KEM and the ECDH component keys independently. ML-KEM key generation follows the specification [FIPS-203] and the artifacts are encoded as fixed-length octet strings as defined in Section 4.1.2. For ECDH this is done following the relative specification in [RFC7748], and encoding the outputs as fixed-length octet strings in the format specified in Table 3.

4.2.3. Encryption procedure

The procedure to perform public-key encryption with an ML-KEM + ECDH composite scheme is as follows:

  1. Take the recipient's authenticated public-key packet pkComposite and sessionKey as input

  2. Parse the algorithm ID from pkComposite and set it as algId

  3. Extract the ecdhPublicKey and mlkemPublicKey component from the algorithm specific data encoded in pkComposite with the format specified in Section 4.3.2.

  4. Instantiate the ECDH-KEM and the ML-KEM depending on the algorithm ID according to Table 5

  5. Compute (ecdhCipherText, ecdhKeyShare) := ECDH-KEM.Encaps(ecdhPublicKey)

  6. Compute (mlkemCipherText, mlkemKeyShare) := ML-KEM.Encaps(mlkemPublicKey)

  7. Compute KEK := multiKeyCombine(mlkemKeyShare, mlkemCipherText, mlkemPublicKey, ecdhKeyShare, ecdhCipherText, ecdhPublicKey, algId, 256) as defined in Section 4.2.1

  8. Compute C := AESKeyWrap(KEK, sessionKey) with AES-256 as per [RFC3394] that includes a 64 bit integrity check

  9. Output the algorithm specific part of the PKESK as ecdhCipherText || mlkemCipherText || len(C, symAlgId) (|| symAlgId) || C, where both symAlgId and len(C, symAlgId) are single octet fields, symAlgId denotes the symmetric algorithm ID used and is present only for a v3 PKESK, and len(C, symAlgId) denotes the combined octet length of the fields specified as the arguments.

4.2.4. Decryption procedure

The procedure to perform public-key decryption with an ML-KEM + ECDH composite scheme is as follows:

  1. Take the matching PKESK and own secret key packet as input

  2. From the PKESK extract the algorithm ID as algId and the wrapped session key as encryptedKey

  3. Check that the own and the extracted algorithm ID match

  4. Parse the ecdhSecretKey and mlkemSecretKey from the algorithm specific data of the own secret key encoded in the format specified in Section 4.3.2

  5. Instantiate the ECDH-KEM and the ML-KEM depending on the algorithm ID according to Table 5

  6. Parse ecdhCipherText, mlkemCipherText, and C from encryptedKey encoded as ecdhCipherText || mlkemCipherText || len(C,symAlgId) (|| symAlgId) || C as specified in Section 4.3.1, where symAlgId is present only in the case of a v3 PKESK.

  7. Compute (ecdhKeyShare) := ECDH-KEM.Decaps(ecdhCipherText, ecdhSecretKey, ecdhPublicKey)

  8. Compute (mlkemKeyShare) := ML-KEM.Decaps(mlkemCipherText, mlkemSecretKey)

  9. Compute KEK := multiKeyCombine(mlkemKeyShare, mlkemCipherText, mlkemPublicKey, ecdhKeyShare, ecdhCipherText, ecdhPublicKey, algId) as defined in Section 4.2.1

  10. Compute sessionKey := AESKeyUnwrap(KEK, C) with AES-256 as per [RFC3394], aborting if the 64 bit integrity check fails

  11. Output sessionKey

4.3. Packet specifications

4.3.1. Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1)

The algorithm-specific fields consists of the output of the encryption procedure described in Section 4.2.3:

  • A fixed-length octet string representing an ECDH ephemeral public key in the format associated with the curve as specified in Section 4.1.1.

  • A fixed-length octet string of the ML-KEM ciphertext, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 4.

  • A one-octet size of the following fields.

  • Only in the case of a v3 PKESK packet: a one-octet symmetric algorithm identifier.

  • The wrapped session key represented as an octet string.

Note that like in the case of the algorithms X25519 and X448 specified in [RFC9580], for the ML-KEM composite schemes, in the case of a v3 PKESK packet, the symmetric algorithm identifier is not encrypted. Instead, it is placed in plaintext after the mlkemCipherText and before the length octet preceding the wrapped session key. In the case of v3 PKESK packets for ML-KEM composite schemes, the symmetric algorithm used MUST be AES-128, AES-192 or AES-256 (algorithm ID 7, 8 or 9).

In the case of a v3 PKESK, a receiving implementation MUST check if the length of the unwrapped symmetric key matches the symmetric algorithm identifier, and abort if this is not the case.

Implementations MUST NOT use the obsolete Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet (tag 9) to encrypt data protected with the algorithms described in this document.

4.3.2. Key Material Packets

The composite ML-KEM + ECDH schemes MUST be used only with v6 keys, as defined in [RFC9580].

The algorithm-specific public key is this series of values:

  • A fixed-length octet string representing an EC point public key, in the point format associated with the curve specified in Section 4.1.1.

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the ML-KEM public key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 4.

The algorithm-specific secret key is these two values:

  • A fixed-length octet string of the encoded secret scalar, whose encoding and length depend on the algorithm ID as specified in Section 4.1.1.

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the ML-KEM secret key in seed format, whose length is 64 octets (compare Table 4). The seed format is defined in accordance with [FIPS-203], Section 3.3. Namely, the secret key is given by the concatenation of the values of d and z, generated in steps 1 and 2 of ML-KEM.KeyGen [FIPS-203], each of a length of 32 octets. Upon parsing the private key format, or before using the secret key, for the expansion of the key, the function ML-KEM.KeyGen_internal [FIPS-203] has to be invoked with the parsed values of d and z as input.

5. Composite Signature Schemes

5.1. Building blocks

5.1.1. EdDSA-Based signatures

Throughout this specification EdDSA refers to the PureEdDSA variant defined in [RFC8032].

To sign and verify with EdDSA the following operations are defined:

(eddsaSignature) <- EdDSA.Sign(eddsaSecretKey, dataDigest)

and

(verified) <- EdDSA.Verify(eddsaPublicKey, eddsaSignature, dataDigest)

The public and secret key, as well as the signature MUST be encoded according to [RFC8032] as fixed-length octet strings. The following table describes the EdDSA parameters and artifact lengths:

Table 6: EdDSA parameters and artifact lengths in octets
Algorithm ID reference Curve Field size Public key Secret key Signature
TBD (107 for testing) Ed25519 32 32 32 64
TBD (108 for testing) Ed448 57 57 57 114

5.1.2. ML-DSA signatures

Throughout this specification ML-DSA refers to the pure version ML-DSA, i.e., in contrast to the pre-hash variant, defined in [FIPS-204].

For ML-DSA signature generation the default hedged version of ML-DSA.Sign given in [FIPS-204] is used. That is, to sign with ML-DSA the following operation is defined:

(mldsaSignature) <- ML-DSA.Sign(mldsaSecretKey, dataDigest)

For ML-DSA signature verification the algorithm ML-DSA.Verify given in [FIPS-204] is used. That is, to verify with ML-DSA the following operation is defined:

(verified) <- ML-DSA.Verify(mldsaPublicKey, dataDigest, mldsaSignature)

ML-DSA has the parametrization with the corresponding artifact lengths in octets as given in Table 7. All artifacts are encoded as defined in [FIPS-204].

Table 7: ML-DSA parameters and artifact lengths in octets
Algorithm ID reference ML-DSA Public key Secret key Signature value
TBD (107 for testing) ML-DSA-65 1952 32 3309
TBD (108 for testing) ML-DSA-87 2592 32 4627

5.2. Composite Signature Schemes with ML-DSA

5.2.1. Signature data digest

Signature data (i.e. the data to be signed) is digested prior to signing operations, see [RFC9580, Section 5.2.4]. Composite ML-DSA + EdDSA signatures MUST use the associated hash algorithm as specified in Table 8 for the signature data digest. Signatures using other hash algorithms MUST be considered invalid.

An implementation supporting a specific ML-DSA + EdDSA algorithm MUST also support the matching hash algorithm.

Table 8: Binding between ML-DSA + EdDSA and signature data digest
Algorithm ID reference Hash function Hash function ID reference
TBD (107 for testing) SHA3-256 12
TBD (108 for testing) SHA3-512 14

5.2.2. Key generation procedure

The implementation MUST generate the ML-DSA and the EdDSA component keys independently. ML-DSA key generation follows the specification [FIPS-204] and the artifacts are encoded as fixed-length octet strings as defined in Section 5.1.2. For EdDSA this is done following the relative specification in [RFC7748], and encoding the artifacts as specified in Section 5.1.1 as fixed-length octet strings.

5.2.3. Signature Generation

To sign a message M with ML-DSA + EdDSA the following sequence of operations has to be performed:

  1. Generate dataDigest according to [RFC9580, Section 5.2.4]

  2. Create the EdDSA signature over dataDigest with EdDSA.Sign() from Section 5.1.1

  3. Create the ML-DSA signature over dataDigest with ML-DSA.Sign() from Section 5.1.2

  4. Encode the EdDSA and ML-DSA signatures according to the packet structure given in Section 5.3.1.

5.2.4. Signature Verification

To verify an ML-DSA + EdDSA signature the following sequence of operations has to be performed:

  1. Verify the EdDSA signature with EdDSA.Verify() from Section 5.1.1

  2. Verify the ML-DSA signature with ML-DSA.Verify() from Section 5.1.2

As specified in Section 3.2 an implementation MUST validate both signatures, i.e. EdDSA and ML-DSA, successfully to state that a composite ML-DSA + EdDSA signature is valid.

5.3. Packet Specifications

5.3.1. Signature Packet (Tag 2)

The composite ML-DSA + EdDSA schemes MUST be used only with v6 signatures, as defined in [RFC9580].

The algorithm-specific v6 signature parameters for ML-DSA + EdDSA signatures consist of:

  • A fixed-length octet string representing the EdDSA signature, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 6.

  • A fixed-length octet string of the ML-DSA signature value, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 7.

5.3.2. Key Material Packets

The composite ML-DSA + EdDSA schemes MUST be used only with v6 keys, as defined in [RFC9580].

The algorithm-specific public key for ML-DSA + EdDSA keys is this series of values:

  • A fixed-length octet string representing the EdDSA public key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 6.

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the ML-DSA public key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 7.

The algorithm-specific secret key for ML-DSA + EdDSA keys is this series of values:

  • A fixed-length octet string representing the EdDSA secret key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 6.

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the ML-DSA secret key in seed format, whose length is 32 octets (compare Table 7). The seed format is defined in accordance with [FIPS-204], Section 3.6.3. Namely, the secret key is given by the value xi generated in step 1 of ML-DSA.KeyGen [FIPS-204]. Upon parsing the private key format, or before using the secret key, for the expansion of the key, the function ML-DSA.KeyGen_internal [FIPS-204] has to be invoked with the parsed value of xi as input.

6. SLH-DSA

Throughout this specification SLH-DSA refers to the pure SLH-DSA version defined in [FIPS-205].

6.1. The SLH-DSA Algorithms

The following table lists the group of algorithm code points for the SLH-DSA signature scheme and the corresponding artifact lengths. This group of algorithms is henceforth referred to as "SLH-DSA code points".

Table 9: SLH-DSA algorithm code points and the corresponding artifact lengths in octets.
Algorithm ID reference SLH-DSA public key SLH-DSA secret key SLH-DSA signature
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s) 32 64 7856
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f) 32 64 17088
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s) 64 128 29792

6.1.1. Signature Data Digest

Signature data (i.e. the data to be signed) is digested prior to signing operations, see [RFC9580, Section 5.2.4]. SLH-DSA signatures MUST use the associated hash algorithm as specified in Table 10 for the signature data digest. Signatures using other hash algorithms MUST be considered invalid.

An implementation supporting a specific SLH-DSA algorithm code point MUST also support the matching hash algorithm.

Table 10: Binding between SLH-DSA algorithm code points and signature data hash algorithms
Algorithm ID reference Hash function Hash function ID reference
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s) SHA3-256 12
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f) SHA3-256 12
TBD (SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s) SHA3-512 14

6.1.2. Key generation

SLH-DSA key generation is performed via the algorithm SLH-DSA.KeyGen as specified in [FIPS-205], and the artifacts are encoded as fixed-length octet strings as defined in Section 6.1.

6.1.3. Signature Generation

SLH-DSA signature generation is performed via the algorithm SLH-DSA.Sign as specified in [FIPS-205]. The variable opt_rand is set to PK.seed. See also Section 9.4.

6.1.4. Signature Verification

SLH-DSA signature verification is performed via the algorithm SLH-DSA.Verify as specified in [FIPS-205].

6.2. Packet specifications

6.2.1. Signature Packet (Tag 2)

The SLH-DSA algorithms MUST be used only with v6 signatures, as defined in [RFC9580, Section 5.2.3].

The algorithm-specific part of a signature packet for an SLH-DSA algorithm code point consists of:

  • A fixed-length octet string of the SLH-DSA signature value, whose length depends on the algorithm ID in the format specified in Table 9.

6.2.2. Key Material Packets

The SLH-DSA algorithms code points MUST be used only with v6 keys, as defined in [RFC9580].

The algorithm-specific part of the public key consists of:

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the SLH-DSA public key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 9.

The algorithm-specific part of the secret key consists of:

  • A fixed-length octet string containing the SLH-DSA secret key, whose length depends on the algorithm ID as specified in Table 9.

7. Notes on Algorithms

7.1. Symmetric Algorithms for SEIPD Packets

Implementations MUST implement AES-256. An implementation SHOULD use AES-256 in the case of a v1 SEIPD packet, or AES-256 with any available AEAD mode in the case of a v2 SEIPD packet, if all recipient certificates indicate support for it (explicitly or implicitly).

A certificate that contains a PQ(/T) key SHOULD include AES-256 in the "Preferred Symmetric Ciphers for v1 SEIPD" subpacket and SHOULD include the pair AES-256 with OCB in the "Preferred AEAD Ciphersuites" subpacket.

If AES-256 is not explicitly in the list of the "Preferred Symmetric Ciphers for v1 SEIPD" subpacket, and if the certificate contains a PQ/T key, it is implicitly at the end of the list. This is justified since AES-256 is mandatory to implement. If AES-128 is also implicitly added to the list, it is added after AES-256.

If the pair AES-256 with OCB is not explicitly in the list of the "Preferred AEAD Ciphersuites" subpacket, and if the certificate contains a PQ/T key, it is implicitly at the end of the list. This is justified since AES-256 and OCB are mandatory to implement. If the pair AES-128 with OCB is also implicitly added to the list, it is added after the pair AES-256 with OCB.

7.2. Hash Algorithms for Key Binding Signatures

Subkey binding signatures over algorithms described in this document and primary key binding signatures made by algorithms described in this document MUST NOT be made with MD5, SHA-1, or RIPEMD-160. A receiving implementation MUST treat such a signature as invalid.

8. Migration Considerations

The post-quantum KEM algorithms defined in Table 1 and the signature algorithms defined in Table 2 are a set of new public key algorithms that extend the algorithm selection of [RFC9580]. During the transition period, the post-quantum algorithms will not be supported by all clients. Therefore various migration considerations must be taken into account, in particular backwards compatibility to existing implementations that have not yet been updated to support the post-quantum algorithms.

8.1. Key preference

Implementations SHOULD prefer PQ(/T) keys when multiple options are available. When encrypting to a certificate that has both a valid PQ/T and a valid traditional encryption subkey, an implementation SHOULD use the PQ/T subkey only. Furthermore, if an application has any means to determine that encrypting to a PQ/T certificate and a traditional certificate is redundant, it should omit encrypting to the traditional certificate.

As specified in Section 3.1, the confidentiality of a message is not post-quantum secure when using multiple PKESKs if at least one does not use PQ/T encryption schemes. An implementation SHOULD NOT abort the encryption process when encrypting a message to both PQ/T and traditional keys to allow for a smooth transition to post-quantum cryptography.

An implementation MAY sign with both a PQ(/T) and an ECC key using multiple signatures over the same data as described in Section 3.3. Signing only with PQ(/T) key material is not backwards compatible.

8.2. Key generation strategies

It is RECOMMENDED to generate fresh secrets when generating PQ(/T) keys. Note that reusing key material from existing ECC keys in PQ(/T) keys does not provide backwards compatibility.

An OpenPGP certificate is composed of a certification-capable primary key and one or more subkeys for signature, encryption, and authentication. Two migration strategies are recommended:

  1. Generate two independent certificates, one for PQ(/T)-capable implementations, and one for legacy implementations. Implementations not understanding PQ(/T) certificates can use the legacy certificate, while PQ(/T)-capable implementations will prefer the newer certificate. This allows having a traditional certificate for compatibility and a v6 PQ(/T) certificate, at a greater complexity in key distribution.

  2. Attach PQ(/T) encryption or signature subkeys to an existing traditional v6 OpenPGP certificate. Implementations understanding PQ(/T) will be able to parse and use the subkeys, while PQ(/T)-incapable implementations can gracefully ignore them. This simplifies key distribution, as only one certificate needs to be communicated and verified, but leaves the primary key vulnerable to quantum computer attacks.

9. Security Considerations

9.1. Security Aspects of Composite Signatures

When multiple signatures are applied to a message, the question of the protocol's resistance against signature stripping attacks naturally arises. In a signature stripping attack, an adversary removes one or more of the signatures such that only a subset of the signatures remain in the message at the point when it is verified. This amounts to a downgrade attack that potentially reduces the value of the signature. It should be noted that the composite signature schemes specified in this draft are not subject to a signature stripping vulnerability. This is due to the fact that in any OpenPGP signature, the hashed meta data includes the signature algorithm ID, as specified in [RFC9580, Section 5.2.4]. As a consequence, a component signature taken out of the context of a specific composite algorithm is not a valid signature for any message.

Furthermore, it is also not possible to craft a new signature for a message that was signed twice with a composite algorithm by interchanging (i.e., remixing) the component signatures, which would classify as a weak existential forgery. This is due to the fact that each v6 signatures also includes a random salt at the start of the hashed meta data, as also specified in the aforementioned reference.

9.2. Hashing in ECDH-KEM

Our construction of the ECDH-KEMs, in particular the inclusion of ecdhCipherText in the final hashing step in encapsulation and decapsulation that produces the ecdhKeyShare, is standard and known as hashed ElGamal key encapsulation, a hashed variant of ElGamal encryption. It ensures IND-CCA2 security in the random oracle model under some Diffie-Hellman intractability assumptions [CS03]. The additional inclusion of ecdhPublicKey follows the security advice in [RFC7748, Section 6.1].

9.3. Key combiner

For the key combination in Section 4.2.1 this specification limits itself to the use of KMAC256 in a construction following [SP800-108]. The sponge construction used by KMAC256 was proven to be indifferentiable from a random oracle [BDPA08]. This means, that in contrast to SHA2, which uses a Merkle-Damgard construction, no HMAC-based construction is required for key combination. It is therefore sufficient to simply process the concatenation of any number of key shares with a domain separation when using a sponge-based construction like KMAC256.

More precisely, for a given capacity c the indifferentiability proof shows that assuming there are no weaknesses found in the Keccak permutation, an attacker has to make an expected number of 2^(c/2) calls to the permutation to tell KMAC256 from a random oracle. For a random oracle, a difference in only a single bit gives an unrelated, uniformly random output. Hence, to be able to distinguish a key K, derived from shared keys K1 and K2 (with ciphertexts C1 and C2 and public keys P1 and P2) as

K = KMAC256(K1 || K2, C1 || C2 || P1 || P2 || algId, 256, domSep)

from a random bit string, an adversary has to know (or correctly guess) both key shares K1 and K2, entirely.

The proposed construction in Section 4.2.1 preserves IND-CCA2 of any of its ingredient KEMs, i.e. the newly formed combined KEM is IND-CCA2 secure as long as at least one of the ingredient KEMs is. Indeed, the above stated indifferentiability from a random oracle qualifies Keccak as a split-key pseudorandom function as defined in [GHP18]. That is, Keccak behaves like a random function if at least one input shared secret is picked uniformly at random. Our construction can thus be seen as an instantiation of the IND-CCA2 preserving Example 3 in Figure 1 of [GHP18], up to some reordering of input shared secrets and ciphertexts. In the random oracle setting, the reordering does not influence the arguments in [GHP18].

9.3.1. Domain separation and binding

The domSeparation information defined in Section 4.2.1 provides the domain separation for the key combiner construction. This ensures that the input keying material is used to generate a KEK for a specific purpose or context.

The algorithm ID, passed as the algID paramter to multiKeyCombine, binds the derived KEK to the chosen algorithm. The input of the public keys into multiKeyCombine binds the KEK to the communication parties. The algorithm ID identifies unequivocally the algorithm, the parameters for its instantiation, and the length of all artifacts, including the derived key.

This is in line with the Recommendation for ECC in Section 5.5 of [SP800-56A]. Other fields included in the recommendation are not relevant for the OpenPGP protocol, since the sender is not required to have a key of their own, there are no pre-shared secrets, and all the other parameters are unequivocally defined by the algorithm ID.

9.4. SLH-DSA Message Randomizer

The specification of SLH-DSA [FIPS-205] prescribes an optional non-deterministic message randomizer. This is not used in this specification, as OpenPGP v6 signatures already provide a salted signature data digest of the appropriate size.

9.5. Binding hashes in signatures with signature algorithms

In order not to extend the attack surface, we bind the hash algorithm used for signature data digestion to the hash algorithm used internally by the signature algorithm.

ML-DSA internally uses a SHAKE256 digest, therefore we require SHA3 in the ML-DSA + EdDSA signature packet, see Section 5.2.1. Note that we bind a NIST security category 2 hash function to a signature algorithm that falls into NIST security category 3. This does not constitute a security bottleneck: because of the unpredictable random salt that is prepended to the digested data in v6 signatures, the hardness assumption is not collision resistance but second-preimage resistance.

In the case of SLH-DSA the internal hash algorithm varies based on the algorithm ID, see Section 6.1.1.

9.6. Symmetric Algorithms for SEIPD Packets

This specification mandates support for AES-256 for two reasons. First, AES-KeyWrap with AES-256 is already part of the composite KEM construction. Second, some of the PQ(/T) algorithms target the security level of AES-256.

For the same reasons, this specification further recommends the use of AES-256 if it is supported by all recipient certificates, regardless of what the implementation would otherwise choose based on the recipients' preferences. This recommendation should be understood as a clear and simple rule for the selection of AES-256 for encryption. Implementations may also make more nuanced decisions.

9.7. Key generation

When generating keys, this specification requires component keys to be generated independently, and recommends not to reuse existing keys for any of the components. Note that reusing a key across different protocols may lead to signature confusion vulnerabilities, that formally classify as signature forgeries. Generally, reusing a key for different purposes may lead to subtle vulnerabilities.

10. Additional considerations

10.1. Performance Considerations for SLH-DSA

This specification introduces both ML-DSA + EdDSA as well as SLH-DSA as PQ(/T) signature schemes.

Generally, it can be said that ML-DSA + EdDSA provides a performance in terms of execution time requirements that is close to that of traditional ECC signature schemes. Regarding the size of signatures and public keys, though, ML-DSA has far greater requirements than traditional schemes like EC-based or even RSA signature schemes.

Implementers may want to offer SLH-DSA for applications where the weaker security assumptions of a hash-based signature scheme are required – namely only the 2nd preimage resistance of a hash function – and thus a potentially higher degree of trust in the long-term security of signatures is achieved. However, SLH-DSA has performance characteristics in terms of execution time of the signature generation as well as space requirements for the signature that are even greater than those of ML-DSA + EdDSA signature schemes.

Pertaining to the execution time, the particularly costly operation in SLH-DSA is the signature generation. Depending on the parameter set, it can range from approximately the one hundred fold to more than the two thousand fold of that of ML-DSA-87. These number are based on the performance measurements published in the NIST submissions for SLH-DSA and ML-DSA. In order to achieve fast signature generation times, the algorithm SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f ("f" standing for "fast") should be chosen. This comes at the expense of a larger signature size. This choice can be relevant in applications where mass signing occurs or a small latency is required.

In order to minimize the space requirements of an SLH-DSA signature, an algorithm ID with the name ending in "s" for "small" should be chosen. This comes at the expense of a longer signature generation time. In particular, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s achieves the smallest possible signature size, which is about the double size of an ML-DSA-87 signature. Where a higher security level than 128 bit is needed, SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s can be used.

Unlike the signature generation time, the signature verification time of SLH-DSA is not that much larger than that of other PQC schemes. Based on the performance measurements published in the NIST submissions for SLH-DSA and ML-DSA, the verification time of the SLH-DSA is, for the parameters covered by this specification, larger than that of ML-DSA-87 by a factor ranging from four (for -128s) over nine (for -256s) to twelve (for -128f).

11. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to add the algorithm IDs defined in Table 11 to the existing registry OpenPGP Public Key Algorithms. The field specifications enclosed in brackets for the ML-KEM + ECDH composite algorithms denote fields that are only conditionally contained in the data structure.

Table 11: IANA updates for registry 'OpenPGP Public Key Algorithms'
ID Algorithm Public Key Format Secret Key Format Signature Format PKESK Format Reference
TBD ML-KEM-768+X25519 32 octets X25519 public key (Table 3), 1184 octets ML-KEM-768 public key (Table 4) 32 octets X25519 secret key (Table 3), 2400 octets ML-KEM-768 secret-key (Table 4) N/A 32 octets X25519 ciphertext, 1088 octets ML-KEM-768 ciphertext [, 1 octet algorithm ID in case of v3 PKESK], 1 octet length field of value n, n octets wrapped session key (Section 4.3.1) Section 4.2
TBD ML-KEM-1024+X448 56 octets X448 public key (Table 3), 1568 octets ML-KEM-1024 public key (Table 4) 56 octets X448 secret key (Table 3), 3168 octets ML-KEM-1024 secret-key (Table 4) N/A 56 octets X448 ciphertext, 1568 octets ML-KEM-1024 ciphertext [, 1 octet algorithm ID in case of v3 PKESK], 1 octet length field of value n, n octets wrapped session key (Section 4.3.1) Section 4.2
TBD ML-DSA-65+Ed25519 32 octets Ed25519 public key (Table 6), 1952 octets ML-DSA-65 public key (Table 7) 32 octets Ed25519 secret key (Table 6), 4032 octets ML-DSA-65 secret (Table 7) 64 octets Ed25519 signature (Table 6), 3293 octets ML-DSA-65 signature (Table 7) N/A Section 5.2
TBD ML-DSA-87+Ed448 57 octets Ed448 public key (Table 6), 2592 octets ML-DSA-87 public key (Table 7) 57 octets Ed448 secret key (Table 6), 4896 octets ML-DSA-87 secret (Table 7) 114 octets Ed448 signature (Table 6), 4595 octets ML-DSA-87 signature (Table 7) N/A Section 5.2
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s 32 octets public key (Table 9) 64 octets secret key (Table 9) 7856 octets signature (Table 9) N/A Section 6.1
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128f 32 octets public key (Table 9) 64 octets secret key (Table 9) 17088 octets signature (Table 9) N/A Section 6.1
TBD SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256s 64 octets public key (Table 9) 128 octets secret key (Table 9) 29792 octets signature (Table 9) N/A Section 6.1

12. Changelog

12.1. draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc-01

  • Shifted the algorithm IDs by 4 to align with the crypto-refresh.

  • Renamed v5 packets into v6 to align with the crypto-refresh.

  • Defined IND-CCA2 security for KDF and key combination.

  • Added explicit key generation procedures.

  • Changed the key combination KMAC salt.

  • Mandated Parameter ID check in SPHINCS+ signature verification.

  • Fixed key share size for Kyber-768.

  • Added "Preliminaries" section.

  • Fixed IANA considerations.

12.2. draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc-02

  • Added the ephemeral and public key in the ECC key derivation function.

  • Removed public key hash from key combiner.

  • Allowed v3 PKESKs and v4 keys with PQ algorithms, limiting them to AES symmetric ciphers. for encryption with SEIPDv1, in line with the crypto-refresh.

12.3. draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc-03

  • Replaced round 3 submission with NIST PQC Draft Standards FIPS 203, 204, 205.

  • Added consideration about security level for hashes.

12.4. draft-wussler-openpgp-pqc-04

  • Added Johannes Roth as author

12.6. draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-01

  • Mandated AES-256 as mandatory to implement.

  • Added AES-256 / AES-128 with OCB implicitly to v1/v2 SEIPD preferences of "PQ(/T) certificates".

  • Added a recommendation to use AES-256 when possible.

  • Swapped the optional v3 PKESK algorithm identifier with length octet in order to align with X25519 and X448.

  • Fixed ML-DSA private key size.

  • Added test vectors.

  • Correction and completion of IANA instructions.

12.7. draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-02

  • Removed git rebase artifact.

12.8. draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-03

  • Updated SLH-DSA by removing parametrization and restricting to three SLH-DSA-SHAKE algorithm code points.

  • Removed NIST and Brainpool curve hybrids, dropped ECDSA from the current specification.

  • Updated KDF as proposed at IETF 119.

  • Removed whitespaces from composite algorithm names.

  • Explicitly disallowed SED (tag 9) and weak hashes when using PQ algorithms.

12.9. draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-04

  • Fixed ML-DSA signature size.

  • Fixed parameters order in PKESK description.

  • Fixed missing inputs into KEM combination description.

  • Improved parallel encryption guidance.

  • Improved SED deprecation decscription.

  • Added ML-DSA test vectors.

12.10. draft-ietf-openpgp-pqc-05

  • Reworked KEM combiner for the purpose of NIST-compliance.

  • Mandated v6 keys for ML-KEM + ECDH algorithms.

  • Defined private key seed format for ML-KEM and ML-DSA.

  • Added key generation security considerations.

  • Replaced initial public drafts with FIPS 203, 204, 205.

13. Contributors

Stephan Ehlen (BSI)
Carl-Daniel Hailfinger (BSI)
Andreas Huelsing (TU Eindhoven)

14. References

14.1. Normative References

[RFC3394]
Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, DOI 10.17487/RFC3394, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3394>.
[RFC7748]
Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves for Security", RFC 7748, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7748>.
[RFC8032]
Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032, DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8032>.
[RFC9580]
Wouters, P., Ed., Huigens, D., Winter, J., and Y. Niibe, "OpenPGP", RFC 9580, DOI 10.17487/RFC9580, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9580>.

14.2. Informative References

[BDPA08]
Bertoni, G., Daemen, J., Peters, M., and G. Assche, "On the Indifferentiability of the Sponge Construction", , <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78967-3_11>.
[CS03]
Cramer, R. and V. Shoup, "Design and Analysis of Practical Public-Key Encryption Schemes Secure against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack", , <https://doi.org/10.1137/S0097539702403773>.
[FIPS-203]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard", , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203>.
[FIPS-204]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard", , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204>.
[FIPS-205]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard", , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205>.
[GHP18]
Giacon, F., Heuer, F., and B. Poettering, "KEM Combiners", , <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76578-5_7>.
[I-D.ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology]
D, F., P, M., and B. Hale, "Terminology for Post-Quantum Traditional Hybrid Schemes", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-04, , <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-pquip-pqt-hybrid-terminology-04>.
[NIST-PQC]
Chen, L., Moody, D., and Y. Liu, "Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization", , <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization>.
[NISTIR-8413]
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Miller, C., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., Robinson, A., Smith-Tone, D., and Y. Liu, "Status Report on the Third Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process", NIST IR 8413 , , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8413-upd1>.
[SP800-108]
Chen, L., "Recommendation for Key-Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions", NIST Special Publication 800-108 Rev. 1 , , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-108r1-upd1>.
[SP800-185]
Kelsey, J., Chang, S., and R. Perlner, "SHA-3 Derived Functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash", NIST Special Publication 800-185 , , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-185>.
[SP800-56A]
Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., and R. Davis, "Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography", NIST Special Publication 800-56A Rev. 3 , , <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3>.

Appendix A. Test Vectors

To help implementing this specification a set of non-normative examples follow here. The test vectors are implemented using the Initial Public Draft (IPD) variant of the ML-DSA and ML-KEM schemes.

A.1. Sample v6 PQC Subkey Artifacts

Here is a Private Key consisting of:

  • A v6 Ed25519 Private-Key packet

  • A v6 direct key self-signature

  • A User ID packet

  • A v6 positive certification self-signature

  • A v6 ML-KEM-ipd-768+X25519 Private-Subkey packet

  • A v6 subkey binding signature

The primary key has the fingerprint 6f98c6e0e5555d9d5807247b2e0a2e9366ab01da29e0c3f1d0ea4c38b13433f1.

The subkey has the fingerprint 56b4a66a79a945f589d1f4869e100f5ee024349871747d6eb5f967b736835922.

-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
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-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

Here is the corresponding Public Key consisting of:

  • A v6 Ed25519 Public-Key packet

  • A v6 direct key self-signature

  • A User ID packet

  • A v6 positive certification self-signature

  • A v6 ML-KEM-ipd-768+X25519 Public-Subkey packet

  • A v6 subkey binding signature

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

xioGUdDGgBsAAAAgoqT/71tSJR8iwTTL04KHMCQPkA/hzws9IS9XIOaDeCTCrwYf
GwoAAABABYJR0MaAAwsJBwMVCggCFgACmwMCHgkioQZvmMbg5VVdnVgHJHsuCi6T
ZqsB2ingw/HQ6kw4sTQz8QUnCQIHAgAAAABTCCAcorV7OTWoI+oc6cJHH7sQwt58
r/zl67/IGhs4IriTdJDozEDjgfDQ+xdUnlNDAH26XFsCpuZlViHCWx7d2+UHYSl5
RoXSl7nUJZwXD+Q14pJe+pXhruANfqpjih0JfA7NLlBRQyB1c2VyIChUZXN0IEtl
eSkgPHBxYy10ZXN0LWtleUBleGFtcGxlLmNvbT7CmwYTGwoAAAAsBYJR0MaAAhkB
IqEGb5jG4OVVXZ1YByR7Lgouk2arAdop4MPx0OpMOLE0M/EAAAAAdU0gQGuJLou9
irG3sTNROnX/x4zsskxbkkpcBQAzEVrH9u/T8HsDJwodnFZSoPvvvrJ6L64wItfd
B6t4zAzd0YL76vTn+V4rzIADNDy4WyqTeysUzJDQQDvLpuOJ2uK2uoIAzsQKBlHQ
xoBpAAAEwLnXFoEjTQ/Zow5/AEqq8vXgv0Kkvz3m9FSpXip7+MsTAVhfO8fOLsy2
grZ1BZl0q2rBaRfPv/jF4Fpq4lpfUdlZ8QCZ6nB/zGtmYAcQQ3qWjCZS8VJB6oC7
hHoGOUOkRxIhZ5kaa9syjuwe97eLz3l/HFwJOVZCj5ROpkCUBgW+7mwnqxCOWkl1
A/gd9moaIFZhcPKVkxEnErYrRmGs0tzKaoBfejetTWMlw8bLQGWq+hC+wQBfSzNs
1bmt2xO08DxZFZFyxSkIxDUy/doh8HlWbdg65zwbZgC9Xfq1RAgpj2AT38MarlEl
JYqqpdgsI8pz0Qyg9rUpI1iJRaIToNBzpBWyKkGC+hwyrgTNXRhANQZK8pkKMXGQ
ffo93jJiBquiF7t8QFIESiJhiCrByCyCagpLhfG3/uQ4aNAxMhspK6amFAONLGwF
LIVJIYwJBgtJstJSAOO5F4eSdYOVTsc015bNVWHD6aBG6RdInvEalRYA2vo43kJP
JpXOWbGxrSN29fc4D4KMqBQ11zuHwxcoUxvLoGlHF5xNU7skSsG8VKBz4suqagqL
oWgMJkxs17Mj+/YNt/Uo6cMBmOC6Dkgz1dIAQPCS93VRy5RnZ/ksOwNvojZrISG2
qjK4zdM3oSbF6OQNpLstGGajRpcrOzWJgXZ1w3ddZwll2DuY9/k4SypuritMljCh
8EVb8YK5T1SmrEx4MZcUeFE5M4uLdwWrvOeOPNJWn2OimJYW25q9X3a7cocItKQU
L6Rog9WYzIeuyleATUlG9kQarVZ9vLLLBpfFXdmuS6nIx0NIPYqrsktYKWkbMYim
RRwJp8OUbXu/E9TB0tG548NVYNVeBQSrgGK9cnAJSPVd1yiXivCzUTRZytCUrFeA
6FUVJyOF0gFR5BIkQhcj6zao5TdhFoURG/VI2ok42xtvK2MIdUGSecCN8cqUUclN
e8YFVZRGUwiAapJTzvpFkzO6otd99eJbuPyagjG6BadalZkuntllEzF3Lamcllsg
GMZkfjm3Y+df6KiStNlGjXXL7oEXeRgSnWWhccVu/jot4JGoFKMK/UHBapG7GDuV
KrWcNRiSHdZ09yJDxqEYZkEmESdzX7AB6nKN1yi0e2NChGgh2Ag5TTSfmVFHrPUy
tMBD7+VLLgfCn9XMiezNFzdKwCUMWybF1fpur7aG5JalAEaJCvMhw4l8ovJGfBEV
4rMvVwgb88svQTc3hIWV0VNCYfSWkvxXy4AXeFQ1p6sKP4pt9wphdTo+fYm5krMQ
K7HHsixxFpzA9UNy7jxpy8Wt+rKPc1Rk4wkPDPlziHmCqyOQoBQIqywyYlB0SJpZ
7qgY4miGkMu4BNujOcoI+HuaV1uS6Ax0dko2ycvC4zODUrahkKg8ZRPNhLmq05h7
uTGjsudQ5iWQ7JKzUvPCIjyLVZFqA/af22t6m8oZ/ZefCkgAHRAdGZGZvbxEUYNG
3+U8uNqNIpV3oGFefKGtdtq8b5HEp9xUDOOOPfVP3OSicnpI0FZV7IaTSRemrsFL
V9UPeKo8jeyDFJQCvnQmM5ygZYmysEiTmKnNX3I7xjhOXtkHGdsF/eatr8BoVWPQ
qqslLuFQ7bvNDj+JrFhpH7SnPRs8wf3CmwYYGwoAAAAsBYJR0MaAApsMIqEGb5jG
4OVVXZ1YByR7Lgouk2arAdop4MPx0OpMOLE0M/EAAAAA2usgXa/Ar56/q2gHD9Ua
/p5Zy9KqvVwJo1dH7PZHuwr6XGuBMZse+oMWt6+QLC/XC0nYBjq5OQXMxNE3xlp8
11Rzyh5HcVt9U07Q+G8GhZCJ8L11scPkk2/T/oIxcVlqBAAE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Here is a signed message "Testing\n" encrypted to this key:

  • A v6 PKESK

  • A v2 SEIPD

The hex-encoded mlkemKeyShare input to multiKeyCombine is 6bab5196b42b06ee30ab6107b7af7a5a2867db4dffa1d1af144d97befea72308.

The hex-encoded ecdhKeyShare input to multiKeyCombine is d68af1960559e3725424eda1480acbc7ac3a71fb13f320069337d9520609d42a.

The hex-encoded output of multiKeyCombine is 0b7a893dc37f7cb8bf963e20121f94029aec577ae77e1b540a440df2f1b3f183.

The hex-encoded session key is 02da6f1ea752c950fdeb1038210b850994bde7f2489641ce85499dea2eae9a5c.

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

Here is a Private Key consisting of:

  • A v6 ML-DSA-ipd-65+EdDSA Private-Key packet

  • A v6 direct key self-signature

  • A User ID packet

  • A v6 positive certification self-signature

  • A v6 ML-KEM-ipd-768+X25519 Private-Subkey packet

  • A v6 subkey binding signature

The primary key has the fingerprint b4713efb190007deef8468ef2f9514124408e0e5cbbe79354554f182802698ab.

The subkey has the fingerprint b86b50d898c93c24ae85cc36bf05c8a8a778978e924276e8fbcec6d4e5ac3eda.

-----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----
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8vOvPjVBpSgDbSTY3jtxVFaz30GrB7RD3QbD63rRqr+xlK4a8EMmthyW/9pEvlTT
i/HJGM5sXq8g3L0Ang4txQKoGdssqsFpWLLiW9qfsHWAY4Ri8dBUHpD//IdHS92h
LlpapsDZ/IWeoQiSkpk0tXjVfRh6EN2Ev2sy19IhTXA5rhgFdWF5GO1MNWaTZoBC
lZF4COLJOSeFpbfZgQ4sxGcmDUoPWm0+vI4uCaihOr7uMRn+xZIAGOmTwxBnO/Oz
BeeLO0mesrsidSq/QTkN1/e9Y6xvdr9z9j+rj/wcAQPPtQwQtav+BQctdZ07OH94
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-----END PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----

Here is the corresponding Public Key consisting of:

  • A v6 ML-DSA-ipd-65+EdDSA Public-Key packet

  • A v6 direct key self-signature

  • A User ID packet

  • A v6 positive certification self-signature

  • A v6 ML-KEM-ipd-768+X25519 Public-Subkey packet

  • A v6 subkey binding signature

-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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JEoCFh6CkaWm4OTpSoqbnw8UNWCgLGxui5vQBVt0fJWWnLW7yOAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAACgwOExkk
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

Here is a signed message "Testing\n" encrypted to this key:

  • A v6 PKESK

  • A v2 SEIPD

The hex-encoded mlkemKeyShare input to multiKeyCombine is 67b591752f895c0edbb990963827b876faf9b72aca33762a422fc9e40712364d.

The hex-encoded ecdhKeyShare input to multiKeyCombine is 76ec0ced0724c3d8ccbf37eb2b45f80d5794f4ecd05d5f1fc777ffa7601651f2.

The hex-encoded output of multiKeyCombine is 630addb63c6fae50e2b14afc94ec2b2beb060527ea1ad230f20edd45e43ed59f.

The hex-encoded session key is ae60488175c59579458abe4007a5b781849c2129ff50e8c7d1cc2f32b351f6a4.

-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----

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-----END PGP MESSAGE-----

Acknowledgments

Thanks to Daniel Huigens and Evangelos Karatsiolis for the early review and feedback on this document.

Authors' Addresses

Stavros Kousidis
BSI
Germany
Johannes Roth
MTG AG
Germany
Falko Strenzke
MTG AG
Germany
Aron Wussler
Proton AG
Switzerland