Extensions to Salted Challenge Response (SCRAM) for 2 factor authentication

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Table of Contents

2. Conventions Used in This Document

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.¶

Formal syntax is defined by [RFC5234] including the core rules defined in Appendix B of [RFC5234].¶

Example lines prefaced by "C:" are sent by the client and ones prefaced by "S:" by the server. If a single "C:" or "S:" label applies to multiple lines, then the line breaks between those lines are for editorial clarity only, and are not part of the actual protocol exchange.¶

3. SCRAM Extension for 2FA

This extension doesn't add any extra roundtrips to SCRAM authentication. SCRAM was designed to be extensible, so it allows for optional and mandatory attributes, which covered by MAC codes. Second "factors" are conveyed in the second message ("client-final-message-without-proof" ABNF production) sent from the client to the server.¶

This extension doesn't change how the client authenticates the server. This extension also doesn't cover enrollment with a 2FA system, such enrollment happends out-of-band.¶

The server authenticates the client after receiving the second message as described in Section 3 of [RFC5802]. If the client included "type" and "second-factor" attributes defined in this document (see Section 5) and the server supports the specified second factor type, the server verifies content of the "second-factor" according to the "type". If the second factor verification fails, the server MUST fail authentication and SHOULD return either "replayed-second-factor" or "invalid-second-factor" error in the "e" attribute. [[It would be possible to make the extra attributes mandatory by using SCRAM's "m=", but the text above doesn't do that. This is one of open issues to resolve.]]¶

4. SCRAM Extension for reauthentication

This reauthentication extension to SCRAM allows the server to return a token that can be used for quick reauthentication and bypasses 2 factor authentication prompt to the user. The reauthentication token is a randomly generated value [RFC4086]. The reauthentication token is returned in the "o" attribute that is appended to the end of the "server-final-message".¶

[[Note: it would be possible to extend SCRAM itself to do reauthentication, by including an earlier received reauthentication token in the "client-first-message" of a subsequent SCRAM authentication. This will also turn off the server checking for 2 factor authentication information, unless the reauthentication attempt is rejected by the server. In the meantime, this document presents some other alternatives on how to use other SASL mechanisms with the reauthentication token.]]¶

When the HT-* mechanism [draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht] is used for the reauthentication after a successful SCRAM authentication, the reauthentication token is the SASL-HT token (see [draft-schmaus-kitten-sasl-ht]). [[Note that the HT hash should probably match the SCRAM hash used or "be better".]]¶

Alternatively, the REMEMBERME mechanism [[add ref]] can be used to reauthenticate after a successful SCRAM authentication.¶

5. Formal Syntax

This document defines the following new SCRAM attributes:¶

• t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. This document defines two possible types: "totp" (see Section 6) and "ctap1" (see Section 8). If this attribute is specified, the "f" attribute MUST also be specified.¶

• f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For "t=totp" it is 6 digit decimal number. [[Use 8 digits per Rick van Rein?]] This attribute MUST be ignored unless the "t" attribute is also specified.¶

• l: This attribute is used by some second factors (e.g. CTAP1) to specify the challenge returned by the SCRAM server.¶

• o: This attribute specifies the base64-encoded value of the reauthentication token.¶

The following syntax specification uses the Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) notation as specified in [RFC5234].¶

   type            = "t=" type-value
                 ; Complies with "attr-val" syntax.
                 ; Returned in client-final-message.
   type-value      = "totp" / "ctap1" / value
                 ; Type of second factor.
                 ; Should be registered with IANA.
   second-factor   = "f=" second-factor-value
                 ; Complies with "attr-val" syntax.
                 ; Returned in client-final-message.
   second-factor-value = 6DIGIT / value
                 ; 6DIGIT when "t=totp".
   server-challenge = "l=" base64
                 ; Data returned by SCRAM server in server-first-message
                 ; to be used for construction of second-factor-value.

   server-error-value-ext =
           "replayed-second-factor" /
           "invalid-second-factor" /
           "second-factor-value-missing"

   value = <as defined in RFC 5802>


   reauth-token = "o=" base64
                  ; base64 encoding of reauthentication
                  ; token.
                  ; Returned in server-final-message.

6. Use of TOTP with SCRAM

When TOTP is used with SCRAM, the following values for "t" and "f" attributes (see Section 5 for their generic syntax) are used:¶

• t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. For TOTP the value is "totp". If this attribute is specified, the "f" attribute MUST also be specified.¶

• f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For "t=totp" it is 6 digit decimal number. This attribute MUST be ignored unless the "t" attribute is also specified.¶

A TOTP URI is specified with the following ABNF:¶

totp-uri = "otpauth" "://" "totp/" label "?secret=" secret
           "&issuer=" issuer
label = issuer (":" / "%3A") identity
identity = 1*CHAR ; URI-encoded SASL identity
secret = 40 * HEXCHAR ; Base32 (hex) encoded secret with no padding.
issuer = 1*CHAR ; Issuer name.

8. Use of FIDO CTAP1/U2F with SCRAM

Note that this section describes steps to achieve Client-to-Authenticator Protocols v1 (CTAP1)/U2F 2FA in terms of CTAP2 API.¶

When FIDO CTAP1/U2F is used with SCRAM, the following values for "t", "l" and "f" attributes (see Section 5 for their generic syntax) are used:¶

• t: This attribute specifies the type of second factor. For FIDO CTAP1/U2F the value is "ctap1". If this attribute is specified, the "f" attribute MUST also be specified.¶

• l: base64-encoded challenge as returned by SCRAM server.¶

• f: This attribute specifies the value of the second factor. For "t=ctap1" it is the CBOR-serialized [RFC8949] value of authenticatorGetAssertionResponse map described below. This attribute MUST be ignored unless the "t" attribute is also specified.¶

SCRAM client sends U2F_AUTHENTICATE command formatted as specified in [FIDO-U2F-Raw-Message-Formats] to the authenticator (e.g. a USB or NFC device).¶

The "P1" framing parameter to U2F_AUTHENTICATE is a single octet parameter defined as follows:¶

• If "up" is set to false, set it to 0x08 (dont-enforce-user-presence-and-sign).¶

• For USB, set it to 0x07 (check-only). This should prevent call getting blocked on waiting for user input. If response returns success, then call again setting the enforce-user-presence-and-sign.¶

• For NFC, set it to 0x03 (enforce-user-presence-and-sign). The tap has already provided the presence and won't block.¶

The "P2" framing parameter to U2F_AUTHENTICATE is a single octet that always has the value 0x00.¶

The "request-data" framing parameter (u2fAuthenticateRequest) to U2F_AUTHENTICATE is constructed as follows:¶

• The clientData structure (see Section 5.8.1 of [W3C_webauthn_3]) is filled in as follows:¶

  • The "type" field has value "webauthn.get".¶

  • The "challenge" field contains the base64url encoding of the challenge provided by the Relying Party. This is the value of the "l" attribute described above. (Note, possibly need to base64-decode and base64url-encode.)¶

  • The "origin" field contains the origin of the SCRAM client in the format specified in [RFC6454], for example "smtp://client.example.net:587".¶

  • Other fields are specified in Section 5.8.1 of [W3C_webauthn_3].¶

• Use clientDataHash parameter of [CTAP2] request as CTAP1/U2F challenge parameter (32 bytes).¶

• Let rpIdHash be a byte string of size 32 initialized with SHA-256 hash of rp.id parameter as CTAP1/U2F application parameter (32 bytes). (The rp.id parameter is the hostname of the SCRAM server.)¶

• Let credentialId is the byte string initialized with the id for this PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor.¶

• Let keyHandleLength be a byte initialized with length of credentialId byte string.¶

• Let u2fAuthenticateRequest be a byte string with the following structure:¶

Generate authenticatorData from the U2F authentication response message received from the authenticator:¶

• Copy bits 0 (the UP bit) and bit 1 from the CTAP2/U2F response user presence byte to bits 0 and 1 of the CTAP2 flags, respectively. Set all other bits of flags to zero. Note: bit zero is the least significant bit. See also Authenticator Data section of [W3C_webauthn_3].¶

• Let signCount be a 4-byte unsigned integer initialized with CTAP1/U2F response counter field.¶

Let authenticatorData is a byte string of following structure:¶

Let authenticatorGetAssertionResponse be a CBOR map with the following keys whose values are as follows:¶

• Set 0x01 with the credential from allowList that whose response succeeded.¶

• Set 0x02 with authenticatorData bytes.¶

• Set 0x03 with signature field from CTAP1/U2F authentication response message. Note: An ASN.1-encoded ECDSA signature value ranges over 8-72 bytes in length.¶

11. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to update the definition of the SASL family SCRAM in the SASL Mechanism registry established by [RFC4422] to also point to this document.¶

IANA is also requested to create a new subregistry of "SASL mechanism" for registering second factor schemes used in the "t" attribute as specified in this document.¶

The registration template is as follows:¶

SCRAM Second Factor Scheme Name:
Pointer to specification text:
Notes (optional):

The registration procedure for the above subregistry is Expert Review.¶

IANA is requested to register a new value in the subregistry defined above:¶

SCRAM Second Factor Scheme Name: TOTP
Pointer to specification text: [[ this document ]]
Notes (optional): (none)

Author's Address