Internet-Draft Problem Statement about Multi-Router and November 2024
Gont & Gont Expires 31 May 2025 [Page]
Workgroup:
IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops)
Internet-Draft:
draft-gont-v6ops-multi-ipv6-00
Published:
Intended Status:
Informational
Expires:
Authors:
F. Gont
SI6 Networks
G. Gont
SI6 Networks

Problem Statement about IPv6 Support for Multiple Routers and Multiple Interfaces

Abstract

This document discusses current limitations in IPv6 Stateless Address Auto-cofiguration (SLAAC) that prevent support for common multi-router and multi-interface scenarios. It provides discussion on the challenges that these scenarios represent, and why a solution in this space is warranted. Finally, it specifies a number of common scenarios that any solution in this space should be able to address.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

This Internet-Draft will expire on 31 May 2025.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [RFC4862] is based on the assumption that SLAAC routers advertise configuration information on a local network, and SLAAC hosts will aggregate this information and use it they see fits. Simple network scenarios where there is a single local router, or where there are multiple routers but all such routers advertise the same information and provide the same service, SLAAC works just fine. However, other more complex (yet very common) scenarios are currently unsupported (or may only be supported by means of non-standard behaviors). These scenarios include:

In the first two scenarios, a SLAAC host will end up receiving information from two routers that are managed by different entities (ISPs) and, for all practical purposes, each piece of configuration information advertised by each router is only of use when employed in conjunction with the rest of the information advertised by such router, and via the router that advertised it. In other words, mixing configuration information from the advertising routers will usually lead to interoperability problems.

The third scenario could be considered a corner-case of the first two scenarios: two or more routers send conflicting information, such as the same SLAAC configuration information with different lifetimes (e.g., one SLAAC router advertises the information with a lifetime of zero, and another advertises the same information with non-zero lifetime). In this scenario, a single router advertising configuration information with a lifetime of zero may simply cause hosts to remove that information altogether.

Section 2 defines the terminology employed throughout this document. Section 3 elaborate on the scenarios described earlier in this section, which not only serve to define the problem statement, but also as test cases for any solution to it. Section 5 discusses future work may be needed to address the problem at hand.

2. Terminology

Multi-router scenario:
A network scenario where two or more routers are attached to the same link.
Multi-interface scenario:
A network scenario where a host employs two or more network interfaces (without considering the "loopback" interface). Some bibliography refer to these hosts as being "multihomed".

3. Scenarios

3.1. Multi-Router Scenario

Consider a network scenario where a user attaches two Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) routers to a local network ("Network_C" in our example) for improved network resilience, The scenario could be defined/described as follows:

  • Two SLAAC routers (Router_A and Router_B) from different ISPs (ISP_A and ISP_B, respectively) are attached to Network C

  • Router A advertises prefix PREFIX_A for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Option (PIO) [RFC4861]), and also enforces ingress filtering [RFC2827].

  • Router A also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNNSS_A) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]), and implements ACLs such that it only processes requests from ISP_A customers.

  • Router B advertises prefix PREFIX_B for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Option (PIO) [RFC4861]), and also enforces ingress filtering [RFC2827].

  • Router B also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNSS_B) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]), and implements ACLs such that it only processes requests from ISP_B customers.

  • Host C attaches to Network C, and thus configures:

    • Addresses in both prefixes (PREFIX_A and PREFIX_B).

    • Two default routers (Router_A and Router_B).

    • Two recursive DNS servers: RDNSS_A and RDNSS_B.

In this scenario, Host C may only send traffic from PREFIX_A via ROUTER_A or from PREFIX_B via ROUTER_B: otherwise, packets will be dropped as a result of ingress filtering [RFC2827]. Similarly, Host C may only send DNS queries from PREFIX_A to RDNSS_A, or from PREFIX_B to RDNSS_B: sending traffic from PREFIX_A to RDNSS_B or from PREFIX_B to RDNSS_A will result in the ACLs enforced by the respective ISPs to drop the DNS queries.

Additionally, it should be noted that it is quite common for DNS responses to depend on the source address of the query. For example, if ISP_A had a cache for the site www.example.com, it is quite likely that a query for www.example.com will map to addresses that are topologically close to ISP_A (or even within ISP_A), for improved service. However, if Host C where to send DNS queries to RDNSS_A, but then issue connections from PREFIX_B, it would most likely enjoy suboptimal service (if not blocked).

It should be evident that each piece of information being advertised via SLAAC is only usable when employed in conjunction with the rest of the information advertised by the same router. However, SLAAC does not require this behavior: according to the current specifications, hosts are free to use any piece of configuration they learn via SLAAC as they see fit.

3.2. Multi-Interface Scenario

This scenario is similar to the one described in Section 3.1 with the only difference in that a host communicated with the two routers over different network interfaces.

Consider a network scenario where a user connects to two different ISPs (ISP_A and ISP_B), via two different network interfaced (e.g., one Ethernet interface and a wireless Wi-Fi interface). The scenario could be defined/described as follows:

  • A SLAAC router (Router_A) from ISP_A is attached to Network_A.

  • A SLAAC router (Router_B) from ISP_B is attached to Network_B.

  • Router A advertises prefix PREFIX_A for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Options (PIO) [RFC4861]), and also enforces ingress filtering [RFC2827].

  • Router A also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNNSS_A) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]), and implements ACLs such that it only processes requests from ISP_A customers.

  • Router B advertises prefix PREFIX_B for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Options (PIO) [RFC4861]), and also enforces ingress filtering [RFC2827].

  • Router B also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNSS_B) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]), and implements ACLs such that it only processes requests from ISP_B customers.

  • Host C attaches to Network_A with one network interface, and to Network_B with another network interface, and configures:

    • Addresses in both prefixes (PREFIX_A and PREFIX_B).

    • Two default routers (Router_A and Router_B).

    • Two recursive DNS servers: RDNSS_A and RDNSS_B.

In this scenario, Host C may only send traffic from PREFIX_A via ROUTER_A or from PREFIX_B via ROUTER_B: otherwise, packets will be dropped as a result of ingress filtering [RFC2827]. Similarly, Host C may only send DNS queries from PREFIX_A to RDNSS_A, or from PREFIX_B to RDNSS_B: sending traffic from PREFIX_A to RDNSS_B or from PREFIX_B to RDNSS_A will resul in the ACLs enforced by the respective ISPs to drop the DNS queries.

Additionally, it should be noted that it is quite common for DNS responses to depend on the source address of the query. For example, if ISP_A had a cache for the site www.example.com, it is quite likely that a query for www.example.com will map to addresses that are topologically close to ISP_A (or even within ISP_A), for improved service. However, if Host C where to send DNS queries to RDNSS_A, but then issue conenctions from PREFIX_B, it would most likely enjoy suboptimal service (if not blocked).

It should be evident that each piece of information being advertised via SLAAC is only usable when employed in conjuction with the rest of the information advertised by the same router. However, SLAAC does not require this behavior: acording to the current specifications, hosts are free to use any piece of configuration they learn via SLAAC as they see fit.

NOTE:
A host implementing the Weak End System (ES) model (see Section 3.3.4.2 from [RFC1122]) could indeed send e.g. packets from PREFIX_A to ROUTER_B.

3.3. Conflicting Information

Consider the case where two routers attach to the same network, and advertise the same configuration information. That is,

  • Two SLAAC routers (Router_A and Router_B) are attached to Network_C

  • Router A advertises prefix PREFIX_A for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Option (PIO) [RFC4861]).

  • Router A also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNNSS_A) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]).

  • Router B advertises prefix PREFIX_A for address configuration (by means of a Prefix Information Option (PIO) [RFC4861]).

  • Router B also advertises one Recursive DNS server (RDNSS_A) (by means of Recursive DNS Server option [RFC8106]).

  • Host C attaches to Network_C, and thus configures:

    • Addresses in PREFIX_A.

    • Two default routers (Router_A and Router_B).

    • One recursive DNS servers: RDNSS_A.

Consider the case where e.g. Router_B is unable to refresh its network configuration information from its upstream, and thus advertises the same configuration as before, but with a lifetime of 0. That is, it advertises:

  • A PIO conveying PREFIX_A with both a Preferred Lifetime and a Valid Lifetime of 0.

  • A RDNSS conveying RDNSS_A with a Lifetime of 0.

Presumably, this means that according to Router_B, this information should no longer be used:

  • Hosts should remove any configured addresses for such prefixes. As a result, they would also abort any ongoing TCP connections.

  • Hosts should also remove the corresponding RDNSS server from their list of RDNSS servers.

This would also happen if Router_A was still announcing the same configuration information with non-zero lifetimes.

It is clear that a more resilient behavior would be to maintain different timers for each SLAAC advertising router. Thus, if a SLAAC router advertised some configuration information with a lifetime of 0, this would simply mean that such configuration information would be disassociated with that particular router. Only when configuration information is no longer associated with any router would the information be removed from the host altogether.

4. Prior Work

[RFC8028] has analyzed the challenge represented by having multiple default routers when addresses from multiple prefixes are employed. However, there are at least two gaps in the specification:

5. Future Work

This document describes a number of common network scenarios that are currently unsupported by IPv6. These scenarios have become more and more common, as a result of:

As a result, this document concludes that protocol improvements that accommodate these deployment scenarios are warranted.

[draft-gont-6man-rfc8028-update-00] is an ongoing effort to improve IPv6 Support for Multiple Routers and Multiple Interfaces.

6. IANA Considerations

This document has no actions for IANA.

7. Security Considerations

This document does not introduce any new attack vectors.

8. Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Brian Carpenter for providing valuable comments on earlier versions of this document.

Fernando would also like to thank Brian Carpenter who, over the years, has answered many questions and provided valuable comments that has benefited his protocol-related work.

9. References

9.1. Normative References

[RFC1122]
Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1122>.
[RFC2119]
Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4191]
Draves, R. and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, DOI 10.17487/RFC4191, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4191>.
[RFC4861]
Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.
[RFC4862]
Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.
[RFC8028]
Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028, DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.
[RFC8106]
Jeong, J., Park, S., Beloeil, L., and S. Madanapalli, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration", RFC 8106, DOI 10.17487/RFC8106, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8106>.

9.2. Informative References

[draft-gont-6man-rfc8028-update-00]
Gont, F., "Support for Multi-Router and Multi-Prefix IPv6 Networks", IETF draft, , <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-gont-6man-rfc8028-update-00.txt>.
[RFC2827]
Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827, , <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.

Authors' Addresses

Fernando Gont
SI6 Networks
Segurola y Habana 4310, 7mo Piso
Villa Devoto
Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires
Argentina
Guillermo Gont
SI6 Networks
Segurola y Habana 4310, 7mo Piso
Villa Devoto
Ciudad Autonoma de Buenos Aires
Argentina